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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
UPTOWN APPLIANCE & RADIO COMpANY, INC., a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
LELAND B. FLINT, FLINT DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, a corporation, REED
BIGELOW, THE PARIS COMPANY, a
corporation, E. M. ROYLE COMPANY,
INCORPORATED, a corporation, and
ROBERT NEVINS,
Defendants and Appellants,

Civil No.
75:9·5
1

ZION'S COOPERATIVE MERCANTILE
INSTITUTION, a corporation, GRAYBAR ELECTRIC COMPANY, a corporation, ORVIL J. COON, dba DARLING APPLIANCE DEPARTMENT,
FRANK WARREN, doing business as
WARREN RADIO COMPANY and
SALT LAKE HARDWARE COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendants.

APPELLANTS' B.RIEF
This appeal is taken ftorr 'the p~urpos!e of reversing
an ·order of the tri·al eourt which Siet aside the Vle·rdict
of a jury and granted a new trial as to these appellants.
Grounds upon which we :seek reV!e·rsal of the trial
court's order are set forth in the petition ulplon which
this app'eal was granted.
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IThe record of the trial helu!W IS now before the
court. It includJe,s, :in addition ·to unusually voluminous
ple~~dings, more than 100 exhihilts and over 2,000 page.s
of trial p·ro~eedings. Becaus:e we believe, and now
urge, inter alia, tha't the trial eourt should have granted
our serve-ral motions to ·dismis:s which were, made ·after all
p~arties had resteid, the eourt is -confronted by the· glOiomy
prospect of examining the ·entire· rle:C!ord. B·ut we most
earnestly pre,ss as valid a number of points which may
be cornsidere!d :and dispo:s.e·d of upon much l~ess than
a full review of the entir1e1 record. For instance, we will
contend herein that the order of the trial court s~ertiing
aside the jury's verdict and granlting ·a new trial as to
these deflendants shows. upon its face that it is invalidthrut it refi.e~ts a usurpation 'Of power nort Vlested in the
trial court fby the ~Sitatutes or the aJpplicaJble rules of
civil procedure.. It will be remembered that thi:s case
was tried in 19·50, ·an~d its. trial was goiVerned by the
new Utah Rules of :Civil Procedure.
1

;The case was tried before the Honorab~e Joseph
G. J epp~son and a jury. Trial 'began 0n January 3,
1'950, and p;rroc~eded from day to day tlrereafter until
F'ebruary 4, 1950, when :the ·case was. suhm:itileid to the
jury. The verdict was unanimous in favor of ~all defendants. On February 16, 19'50, pJaintiff filed its motion
1

1

1

1

for a new trial. On

Sl~pltember

5, 19·50, th-e Judge made
his order d!enying the motion for n1ew trial as to Graybar
Electric Comp~any, Z. C. M. I. and S·alt Lake' Hardware
Comp·any, and gran1ting the motion as to Roiberlt Nevins,
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R·eed C. Bigelo,v-, L·elan:d B. Flint, Flint Dis~tributing
Compan:y, E. 1\I. Boyle Company and Tlte p,a,ris Company.
1

~STATEMENT

·OF F kCTS

Plaintiff is Uptown Ap!pliance and Radi!o Company,
Inc. It was organized in 1947 to engage: in the r~e~tail
sale 'Of electrical appliances in !Sialt Lake 'City. The business ;was conceived in the min.ds of Briant ·s,. Badger,
Ralph 0. Bradley ;and J~ean W. McDonough. The rleeord
does nott show that any ·of 'them had ever had any substantial business ·ex!perience. We mention this :becaus~e
the record will snow fuat any ibusinless ·difficulties. which
OVJertook them were of their own making, 'and is in no
sense -chargeable to any of thes.e app·ellants (;Tr. 2'129,
1675, 1676).
In th·e early fall :of 1947, Bradley, Badger and
McDonough agr1eed to 'enter upion the retail appJianc:e,
business as co-parltners; (Tr. 680). In the fiormative
stages 0f 'their 'business they recognized their own lack
of ·experience ;and sens·ed the neeessity of assnciating
with themselves som·eone who f~Jou.l!d bring to the. ente:rprise siome 'knowle:dge of fisical control 'and accounting.
A·ccordingly, they invited Leland B. Tanner to p'articipate wiJth them. :Tanne!r, like 'themselves, w;as without
substantial !busriness 'experience, so fiar as the re:cord
shorws. ·The:ve is nothing to indicate that he ever had any
experience in the 'Operation of a retail bu:sinJe1s:s; 'but he
had :for som~time ibeen emp~loyed by Wells., Baxte~r an~d
1

1
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Miller, a firm of Certifiled Public Accountants CT'r. 1563).
The partnership· 'idea was dis·ca;rded and the plaintiff
corporation was organized in 1'947 (Tr. ,680) with B'adger
as P'~esident, Bradley as Vice President, and T'anner as
Secr!Htary and ·Treasurer. Bradley, Badger, T·ann-er and
McDonough and their res1peetive wives ·e$h subscri!bed
I
$2,000.00 ·to make up the firm's total capital of $16,000.00.
It is interesting an!d imporltant to note that McDonorugh
and Bradley never paid in quite thle· full amount of their
subscriptions (Tr. 1431). Financi~al statements thereafter ma:de rby the plaintiff to its creditors ·concealed the
fa0t tha;t there was any dJeficiency in p~aid-in capital.
The amount of unpaid capital subscriptions were inchided in' '.~ccounts receivable'' (Exhibits j50 ·and 51; Tr.
1448, 1449).
At any rate, plaintiff hegan· its corp01rate life wilth
somethnl'g les:s than $16,000.00 ('Tr. 6:80). It elected to
transact 1busines:s at 38 Sourth Main Stre~et in ·salt Lake
City. That sp·ruce WaJs held under lease hy the op~erator
of a shoe shine parlor. T'O induCle~ the hootblack to vaCJate:
the premiS'eS and make ro:om r01r plaintiff's rup:pliance
s:to·re, plaintiff was required to p~ay $3,000.00 ( Tr. 681,
682). Rehalbilitation and ~decoration of the p·remises to
make· them suitaJble~ for the app~liance 'business. requir~d
the exp~enditure of 'approximately $4,000.00 (Tr. 811).
1

It will he se'en, therefore, that 'approximately h'alf of
plaintiff's capital was. sp:ent herore it acquirred a stock
of goods and o~pene'd its place ·for ~business. :That fact is
important as be~aring urp1on the good faith nf plaintiff's
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case, and is significant wh·en considered in conn·ecttion
''~ th plaintiff's f a.ntastic demands as reflected in its
prayer for damages.
Before ·opening for business in Norvemhe-r, 1947,
plaintiff made eonnootions 'vith certain Wh'Ole~salers. 'Other
than those involved in this case, as the result of which
it was a:ble to stock its store with various electrical
appliances. :The store was !Oipen~d for trade at the1 ·end
of NoiVern!ber, 1947 (Tr. 6871;o 689).
During the year ·of 1948, plaintiff secured :franchises
or other autlrorization from various distributors. fior
the sale of certain of their products at r~ail .at its. Main
Stroot stoTe. Plaintiff began the purchase of Easy Washers from Z. C. M. I., Bendix and Klelvinator appHJ~ees
and Zenith radios from Flint Distributing ,Comp:any,
Hotpoint appliances from Graybar Electric Comp·any,
and RCA radios from Glenn Earl Distributing ~Com
~pany. Later in 1948 it began the p~urchaS'e of phonograp1h
records : Columbi'a reco~d:s. ftom Flint Distri.Jbuting ·C'ompany, RCA records from Glenn Earl Dis1tributing Company, D·eooa records from Salt Lake Hardware ·C ompany, and othe-r recoTdB from oth·e:r distributors. llt
should fbe noted that when p~aintiff made ilts cormeeti'Ons
with Z. ~c. M. I., Flint Distri!buting Comp,any, Salt L1ake
1

Hardware and GI"ayibar Electric 'C:omp;any, its only

of lbusines~s. was at 38 S:outh M·ruin
anees !by pJaintiff at any ·o'ther

~Street.

p~l$e

p~l:ace

!S!ale of appli-

was not then in the

contemplation 'of th·e p;arties. No claim was made upon
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the- tri1al that any 'Of thb1se c'Ompanies was under any
agreement or !Oiblig~ti:on ito continue for any length o.f
time to furnish merchandise to p~aintiff for resale.
Plaintiff claimed that the· wholeS'alers menrtinn.e:d coul\d
not !:awfully dis(~Jontinue s:ale to it as the result nrf any
conce~rted action or conspiracy.
W·e paus·e •to ~deseribe briefly the com1pe1Jitive fi~·ld
upon which plaintiff 1a~che:d its business.. Wlren pJaintiff located at ·38 ·South M;ain Street it found its,elf almost
next door to the Warren Radro Ciomp:any, which was
and h~d bre·en :doing busmes.s at 28 S:outh Main Street
for many years. Plaintiff was d!irootly across the stre~et
from Z. C:. M. I. where ·a retail ap~pliance 'business had
1

been carried nn :Eor many years. The fact is that upon
Main s:treet i8Jt that time thlere were not leiSS than fifteen
retail appliance stores ( T'r. 2020, 2021). It is als.o a

faet thrut

~at th~rut

time th·ere were 3'2'3 retail apf)Jiance

stores in S:alt L!Rke ·City 1and vicinity (Tr. 19·33, 1934).
1

Under--capitalized ·an!d 'DiVer-mailllJeod as plaintiff wrus,

it seemed to he, going along in a noirmal wa;y until it made
its unfortUIUate association wilth Glenn Erarl. E:arl held
the 'ilis:rihutorshlp, for RadtiJo Ciorporation of America
produeits in Utah, Idaho and :a part of .O;regon. He
effected distribution of RCA lpirlodU:cts in that wide, area
;

through :aeaJe·rs. whom he sHlecte;d ~and licensed or other-

wise aurthorizerd itJOI distribute his p~oducts in ther several
communritjjes in whieh th:ey idi!d business. He rbought merSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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chandise directly from RCA, ·and resold it to ·de,alers
"~hon1 he had selected. The number of de,alers a.uth!olrized
by hrim to 'Sell RCA radios and rooords totall~d 175 ('Tr.
673.).
In the spring of 1948 Earl discoV1ered that he had
critically over bought from the manufootur-e:r and wa:s
facing financial di·saster. He had in stock 300 to 3'50
high-p~ced consol·e radios which were aJb'out to become
Obsolete. They were the 610-V1 modJel much talked
aJbout ·during the trial.. T'O use lris, language upon the
witness stand, E-arl ' 'could not ·eat'' thos·e old models.
He "was stuck with them" and "had to shake them
off'' 'Or face ruin (Tr. 622, 6:23).
E~arl

importuned all 'Of his 175 dealers to take some:
of his outmoded merchan!dise. 'T;hey all refus:e:d--iall but
plaintiff. Pl'aintiff was Earl's only '·'taker" and he
wo~ked off his entire S'tock upion plaintiff (Tr. 62'3).
Plaintiff was thus victimiz!ed b·y Earl arrd was ror~ed to
businJess praCJtices which ~degraded the tr~de, nHme of
RCA and other comp·ert:.ing p:rO'ducts purchased from
other distributors by the p·lafutiff.
As fast as Earl passed on ·610-V1 models to pJaintiff, he p:assed to p]ruintiff the necessity of working off
obsolete merchandise 'Or 'being ' 'stuck'' with it. .A!eco1r'dingly, p·lain!tiff began J1e:sioT'ting to rrudio mystery tunes,
guessing games. a.nd the 1promiscuous giving away 'of
gift -certificates to induce p,eiopJe to huy ('Tr. 701 to 711).
M·eam.while,

E~arl,

in keep·ing with RCA policy, refused
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to :allow -any other dealer in BJCA radios to advertise
RC:A radlols at !Rrny discount below retail p rices. sugges·terd hy him. Earl -siold RC·A radros. to N·evins and
Royle: and other d~ealer1s. n'Ot pa~ties to this litigation.
He required them to maintain ''list priee1s'' while p~ain
tiff was J'leso;rting to all manne·r of discount s·chemes to
work off the ohsol:erte: 6l0-V1 RCA radios upion the public
('Tr. ~630). Dis-counting RCA radios naturally b(rought
on di:s(~~ount biY pJJaintiff of the p:rice iof othe1r radios.,
including Zenith. And, 'Of ~our's·e, disCJountJing one moidle1
RCA ramo maide it difficult for any dooleT to m-arintain
list p~rice-s on other mo dels.
1

1

During 'the summer 'and fall of 1948, ·dea1e;rs N~evins
('Tr. 6·2:9) and Royle (Tr. '6i32') comp,laineld to Earl an~
toJ~d htim that th·ey must he pe;rmitted to adverlis·e discounts 'as l'ong as the' practice p;ersisted at pla~ntiff's
S'tore. ·O'rvil ·Coon, another ·d~al1er (Tr. ·6·34) ·dealing in
RCA radios, :i.niormed Earl that he w<YUld he fiorced to
'Wdvertis~e RC'A rladios~ rut a ·diseount if he was to moV1e
his -stock rof mer·cJhandis;e. E:arl',s, answer wa:s that dealers tC~ould niot dis-count; that they had refus'e'd to buy tJhe
otbs olete 610-V1 anJd would have to mainJtruin list ~ri:ce1s
upon the RCA merehoodJis1e which they ·had pu.rohas·ed
(Tr. 6:30).
1

1

In the early rail of 1948, p·~ainttiff installed a rooo:rd
~deplar'tment and ·acquir e'd ·the right from Earl to r~ail
RCA :rooor'ds. In November 1948, Earl entered up,on a
'' F~air ·T'rade'' !ag!1eement with Rofbert Nevins co:ve:ri.ng
RCA recoirds '(!T'r. ·637, 11'2~, 1125, Exhilhit Q:O').
l

1
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The Fair Tra:de agre:ement was duly regis,tered 'vith
the Trade Commission of trhe State of Utah ion November
30, 1948 (Tr. 11'25; Ex. PP), 'an!d thereupon it bocame
unla·wful for any retailer to sell RCA re!cords. at p1rices.
belo1v tlros-e fixed in ·the trade agreement (Utah Code
Annotated, 1943, Title 16A, Chap~ter 3).
In December plruintiff began the sale of F·air 'Traded
R:CA records ·art; ia twenty per ·cent discount. That was
done to attradt business and 'Stimulate sal~e of ofue,r
merchandise in plruintiff's Sitore. Plaintiff's sale of RCA
records at a discount was ·soon hrought to the att·e~ntion
of other RCA ·dea1er.s. by their -customers·.· ··Other de·alers,
including T·he Paris Company (Tr. 1076), Z. C. M. I.
('T·r. 9'99), and Bigelow (Tr. 99'2) confirmed th·e s.ale
by plaintiff of RC·A records at ·a discount hy causing
purchases to be maJde at plaintiff's :store. Naturally,
dealers wh'ose shelves were s:tocked with reco:rds which
1

could not be discormted to comp1ete with identical rner1

·chandise off.elied by plaintiff eornplained to Earl ('Tr.
591) and insisted that something be do:ne to eliminate
the comJp,etitive advantage ·enjnyed by plaintiff through
violation of the Fair 'Trrude ~agreement. That ·is hoiW
and why The P~aris Comp,any ~and Bigelow became involv~d

in '<~ontro:v:ersy with E~arl. They in:sistted that
E:arl stop vioJ:ation of . the Fair 'Trade agr·e:ement
by pJaintiff, or p1e~rmit them to dis[count. ·They gave

Earl the alternative· of rebuying the stocks they had on
hand ·(~Tr. 5~91 to 606·).
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In November, 1'948, plaintiff opiened ·a store 'On State
Street ur1der the name of Radio Cicy. Flint DistriJbuting
Company -authorize1d plaintiff to ·slell Kelvinator and B;endix produc:ts, an!d Zenith radios, and certain other pr:o~
ducts at thrut s't1ore ( Tr. 18'9'2'). In D-ecemhe,r, 1948, p·laintiff le~sed s.pace 'On Pierpont Street, in th·e warehouse
district of 'S,alt Lake 'City, and ·thJe,re !began the s'ale of
all typ~e·s of merclrandis.e !BJt heavy discount to certam
large group·s of industrial and commercilal employees
('Tr. 72·3 to 742) .
On D!ooember 13, 19'48 ( Tr. 18319), Bradley, B'aldger,
MeD onough 1and :T·anner met at the office of Flinlt Dis..
tributing 'C'ompany wfuth Lelan'd B. Flint and his ~depart
ment heads :and ~e!rtain ·othe:r ernlp1oyees. It is without
dispute rtlrrut the first p~a:rlt of that ~conference was, devoted
to ;a friendly idiscussion of Kelvinator p~odudts. Flint
was urging praintiff 's repreS'entatives to purch'ruse a
large s:tock ·of ~elvlliator ice boxes and other p·roducts
('Tr. 1840, 755, 101J5). There is a dispute in the record
as to wh!at was dJiseussed foHoiWing the refietrences to
Kelvilrator. Plrui:ntiff 's rep·res.e;ntatives testified thaJt
Fi:hrt ito~d them that tbJerir discounting p;ractices were
getting them in tr'ouhle, an!d 1tha1t unles's they chang~d
the:ir ways they would he ·destroye!d ('T'r. 75·6). They
~luirge Flint with s talting th:at !a;t thalt very time -a meet1

1

1

1

ing ·Was hieing held in 'S!alt Lake C]ty at which p·laintiff''s
£rute was to he settled ( Tr. 7;57). AeCJolrding to- them,
p~~r.sotn;s

/then convening to s·ettle
plaintiff's £alte were the manager'S of s:oultiheast FurniFlint s tated 'that the
1
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turte Company, The Paris Company, Z. C. M. I., an d
Gus P. B·ackman, Executive SooretaJry of S~alt Lake. City
Chamber of Commerce {Tr. 757). Flint 'and all of his
ass·ociates denied that Flint haJd ever referre1d to :any
such meeting, or that lue had ever "told p·laintiff 's representaJtives tlrat 1p~aintiff was ·a:boill!t to be de:Stroyed ( Tr.
1846, 1847). That nJo meeting of p:ers·ons rep·re·sentmg
·Southeast FurnituTe 'Company (T:r. 1793.), \T·he Paxi:s
Company ('Tr. ·2111), Z. ·C. M. I. (Tr. 2'119') and Gus P.
B aclrman (·Tr. 1787) was ever hJe,ld was es:tafbJishe·d without dispute by the testimony of each of the~ p·e:rtsons refeT·red to.
1

1

On 'Or about D·ecember 15, 1948, L·eland B. Flint
learne'd of the war~eh<>use 'operarbions being carried otn hy
the plaintiff on Pierpont ·Street ·(Tr. 1850). His rep:reS'entatives infiormed plaintiff that p~aintiff would no:t he
allowed to distribute Bendix ('Tr. 1'96·6·, 19·68) or Kelvinartor ('T'r. 1805) prioducts through the PiJe1rp;ont wrur'ehouse, but would ibe permitte·d to continue the s'ale of
Zenith radios and CiOlmnfbiJa rooords: ( Tr. 1154). Thereupon, plaintiff told Flint that it did not trust him and
that if plaintiff pould not S'ell 'as it pleaJs:.ed all ·of the
lines distri!bute·d !by Flint, i>Jailltiff wan1:Je·d none of his
line ('Tr. 770). P~aintiff 'arranged to relturn to Flint
all mercha.n!dis-e then on bJand and ·theretofore pur~ehased
from him, and to receive cr~dit fior such mer'chandise
:against th1e· large ·balance owing Flint (Tr. 1807).
I
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·On D·ecember 17, 19~8, Flint called upon Ha;:roJd
H. Benne1tt, V~ce P:restident and General Man·ager of
Z. C. M. I., .and ·s~poke 'briefly about the typ·e of op·era;tion
carri:e~d on by p·lain!tiff 'rut th!e Pierp.ont warehouse. On
that ·occasion Flint 'e)Chi!hiteid ·to Bennett one of tlre caTds
employed fby p·laintiff in ialdvertising it::; warehJofU!S·e op;eration on Pierponlt ~street. Early in January, ·afte!r Flint's
me~rchJandise ·haJd heeu returned 'to him hy plaintiff, and
·after Z. ·C. M. I. b!ad dis!ConJtinued the 'S'ale ·of Easy
Washers. 'to p~lruinrbiff, Flint was :again in Bennett's office.
That mee!ting wrus most 1brief. Flint s:aid, ''Mr. Bennett,
I under1s tand yoru. are not ge1tting along ve·ry well with
Uptown Ap·p·liance. Is that right~'' Bennett's reply was,
'' ·Tha;t is righ!t.'' Thlat wa:s the eJCtent of the conversation
between Flintt 1and -BHnnetJt CT·r. 1853:, 1854) . Thos'e· brief
·convers~aJtions between FEnt and B·ennett were seized
u1pon hy ~the p•laintiff as the geDle's:is. of ~the alleged conspiracy. F'o:r s1ometime p:rior to the 17th 'Of Deeember,
19·48, eompl'ain ts hald been reaching Mr. B·ennett f·rom
his !dep~artmen.t helakLs ·to the ~eff•eet that the trade practices of plaiin.tiff, .a,s they related to Easy Washe':vs., we,re
diseredritmg that ·CJommodity in the market (;Tt. 980,
983). Benneltt ther'eifor1e, ~decided to diseo~tinue the 'S'ale
of Easy Washers to p·laintiff Mtil p·laintiff. should rudopt
a method of :advertising ~and iSiale of Easy Washers in
harmony with Mr. B enn:e1tt 's notiions of 'SIOflilld me1rchandisring ('T'r. 98H, 987).
1

By the first week in Jianuary, 19'49·, there was a
general re'sentment 'amorrg ·retaile~r's of RCA 'records, who
were re!Strained by the F1ai!r !T:raide law from comp·eiting
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with plaintiff. On J~anuary 5, 1949, Jules ·S. Drey:Dou~s,
\·"ice Presidelllt of The Paris ·Comp~any, invited retailers
of RCA records -to meet at the Ho tel Utah. Such a meeting was held and those pres:ent were E. M. Royle·, Mr.
Holland, ·a repre~sent·ative· of Glen Broth·ers Mus~c ·C:ompany, two representatives of Dtaynes Music Company,
a reprresenfuJtive of Clark Radi o Comp~any, Reed C.
Bigelow, Harold H. Benneltt of Z. C. M. I., and two repres·entativ8ls of 'The P:aris Company. The: su!hject of discussion was the sale of phoillograph recor ds in viol~ti'On
of the Fair T'rade laws. A. H. Nebeker, a memfber of
the Bar, and ·at:torney ror The Paris ~C:ompany and
Z. C. M. I., was. called in to .advis~e~ those pre,s:ent. He
told them thrut there was danger in coneeiflted action,
and th~t the -state should police the Fair 'T;rade law.
The meeting thereup·on tbroke up· (Tr. 989 to- 99·6).
Dfleyfous, ·of 'The p:a;ri.Js ·C ompany, to;ok the ma;tter up
with the Trade Ciorrumssion, :aJl!d therearter a leltt~r
wa1s written hy the Secretary of the Trade· C'Om:rni!S sion
to P lainti.ff directing plailitiff to ceas~e violation of the
E1air Trade a~eement ('T:r. 1480 to 1482, E:x:lribit 44).
1

1

1

1

1

1

·The method used by plaintiff in the sale of RCA
records wtrus rto sell a book for $20.00 which ~orrtaine:d
$25.00 worth of eorupons go1o1d for the purC!ha;s;e of plhonograph records. It was. ~sh!orwn tlrat such cou~p,on·s coi111:d
be us·ed ~or the purchrus:e of Decca records and other
reeords, ·rus well as RCA records (Tr. 1000, 13'54). When
the man~ager :of Salt Lake H·a~dware le1ar'Il:ed 'of the
1

I

coupon melth!old of priee dis-counting, he concluded that
I
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the value of his company's la1"ge inventory would he
jeopardized hy sueh long ~term d.iseount, !and refused
to :CoilJtinue the sail.e to plaintiff of Deooa records until
the p'raetiee hrud ibHen ·diSf~Jontinu~d, and th·e effect o.f the
corupon hooks h!aJd spent itself (iTir. 1919, 1'929, 1959).
In Fehrnary' 1949 ' G:r~a~-Ahar
Electric :bejcame eonJU
cerned aborult the credit ,sjtanding of p~aintiff and suggested thlrut it c;oop1errute with p~aintiff in 'an effoirt to
h:ave p~airrtiff ',s. me!r'ooandis:e '' fio,or p~lanned'' so ·as. to
relieve plaintiff':s eredit situation.. Those efforts failed,
an!d in February G:vaybar ·refused 'to sell Hotpomt merchandis!e: lto ~~aintiiff ('Tr. 205·2 to 205·6·).
t

On J'anll!ary 1~5, 1949, T!anner resigned f~om P'laintiff
and resume:d :his emploiJIDent w:iJth W etls, Baxter and
Miller. In May, 1949, p1aintiff turned OiVe'r its, lease
at 38 'South M'ain S1treet to Bradle:y an'd ·Badger. ·Th01se
two coDJtinued 1at thaJt place in the refuil app1liance
busine,ss under 'the name of B·mdley-Baldger ('Tr. 816,
817). ·They were 'S'O iengaged at the time of the tri:al
CTr. 82'5).
In August, 19·49·, MeDonough took empiloyment with
Glenn E:arl ~as :an app11±ance sruesm!an ('Tr. 1008, 1009).
o:n Fehrua.ry 18, 1949, plaintiff brought this suit
again:sft Le~a.Jl!d B. Flint; Flint Distr~buting ·Company,
a ~corpo'r'ation; Ree:d Bigelow, The! Paris Comp'any, a
corp:o:raltion; ·Graylbiar Electric IC:omplany, a ro'rporation;
O·rvil J. C'Oion, domg ·business ~as Darling App~liance:
D·e1plartmen.t; Zion ',s (Coop~er,ative Me~rcatttile Institution,
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a corporation; E. :nr. Royle C:omp:any, Incorporate d, ·a
corpo·ration; Frank v"V·a:rren, dloting busineiSS aiS Warren
Radio Coinpiany; Salt Lake Hardwa:re Company, ·a -corporation; and Robert Nevins, claiming that they had
conspiroo to fL"'C and maintain p~rices in the Salt Lake
territo:ry on applianee's, ·radio instru1nent's and reco:r ds,
to limit the quantity and number 'Of ·such ~ar.ticlers to be
sold, and to persu!alde, induce, en!t~ce and 1J.y thr,erats tio
cut off the source of supply of merehandise: to the P'laintiff, and ge'nel'lally to cause 'the ~destruction 'Of p~aintiff'iS:
business (Tr. 1 to 15). Plaintiff, in its third amen!de'd
complaint, upon which it went rtJo trial, claimed :actu'a:I
damage in the sum of $443,347.67, and 1p1rayed fior tre:ble
damages in the sum of $1,3:30,423..9'2 ( Tr. 46 to 5'5).
At the close of the trial, 'anld 'after all the ·eiVidenee was
in, plaintiff amended its ~ayer to -rre,duce its 'actual
damage f}}om $443,347.67 to $200,000.00, ;aJl!d its p;rayer
1

1

for tr~b~e damages from $1,330,423.92· to $.600,000.00
('Tr. 2190).
1

After p~rui.ntiff':s original complaint wrus ffied, nnme'rous mo'tio·ns weTe l01dged in good 'time iaga:ins!t s1aid complaint, 'as the result of which p~l·ain!tiff wa1s, requi~e,d to
~ompillaint

from time to time during 1949.
A~ter thH third 1amende d comp~Iaint had heen filed, and
motions ruddres,sed 'thereltJo haid heen argued and ~ove~r
amen!d its

I

1

ruleld defen.~dlan1ls we1re re~quired to answe·r. There followed an extended an:d p.rotracted p,retrial p~rocedurre ('Tr.
88 to 96 .and 98 to 100) and the case was 'set for trial on
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December 112, 1'949. Trial wa.s the·reafter continued first
until December 27, 1949 (Tr. 94) and then again continued until January 3, 1950.
Plaintiff. was r'epre,sen'ted in all p'r;e-trial matters by
W. C. Lamoreaux, and upon the 'trial by W. C. Lamo~
e1aux.·and B. E. Roher'ts. Def·en1d!ants were represented:
Flint Distributing ·Comp1a.ny 'aJl:d Leland B. Flint hy
Harley W. Gus~tin and HaroJd R. B. oyer; ·SiaJ.t Lrake Hrardware by Frrank A. Johnson; Gr'ayhar E'lectric by W. W.
Ray and Athol Rawlins; Z. C. M. I., The Paris Comp1any
antl Ree·d Bigelorw lby P 1aul H. Ray, S. J. Quinney and
Al1b~rt R. Bowen; E. M. Royl~e 'and Frank Warren hy
D'e]be~t M. D·:vaper ; Rohe!r't Nevins by Gordon B. Christens,on, an!d Orv:ill. J. Coon by M·arvin J. Be·:rtoch.
Ov~r

the 'olbJection ·and affidavit of counsel for all
defendants thJat 'the Honora:b~e Josieph ·G. J ep·pson was
biaJs·ed anJd prejudiced •and the'rerore di:squalifie~d to hear
and try the clrus,e·, Judge J epp:son. caNed th·e, ~ase ~o'r t'ri·al
before himse~lf ·and a jury on JanuaJry 3, 1950 (Tr. 460).
:T·lre affidavit denominate~d ''AFFIDAVIT' .OF BIAS,
·C·ERTIFIC.A:TE O·F C·OUNSEL, AND APPLT·CA'T'IO·N
FOR DIS.Q·UALIF'ICATION .O'F JUDGE,'' signetl'and
swolrn to hy -counsel for !all the. rdefendants, omitting the
c!ap tion ·and signJatur'els, :re,a.Jd as rol~orws: (Tr. 101 to 104).
1

' ''The un1der:signeld, ~attoii'ne~s ·of record or
·Otherwise, f!o~r the! V!~rious defendants. in the: ruho;veentitJled caUJse 'amid 'action, afte1r being ~duly sworn
eacil f:or hims·eJf (iepos,e:s and sa.ys:
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'' Thrut h·e is of the :belief th'rut the H>ono,rahle
Jos·eph G. Je·pps!on, the Judge hefiore. whom the
above cause is set for trial, is. p·rejudiced therein
'ag·ainst the defendants ~above n amHd Rn'd ~s:ome, if
not aM, of their respective attorneys, and h!as a
biaJs in favor of the P'laintiff aboVle nam'ed.
1

''That the said Judge has giVlen the, appietarance of a peJrsonal ·desire rto try ·said cause and
affiants bHlieve tha:t he, the s'ai'd Judge, for T'e'asons personal to hims1eJlf, ha;s retaine'd and is
attemping ·to retain on his .own trial ·calen!dar s,aid
oo.use for triaJl, 'although n:o~mally fby re'as:on of the
rules and practices of 'the Judge18 of the Third
J udic±ai Court in anJd ror S'aillt Liake Clorunty, State
of Utah, ·s.aid eause would, :as of this !date, he assigned 1befio:re, 'all entirely dif:Ve1rent Judge, an!d
thiat as of 'this d!ate the said HonoT'able· Jos'eph G.
JeppsiQin wol]l:d nOit. h'ave assigned to him, in regular course, the 'trial of con·tro;verte:d ma1tlter:s; thrut
on the 2'9th day of No:vember, 1949, at a p·re-trial
hearing of the ruboVle en~ti tled cause ~and ·action, a
motion. hy all of the ·defendants then p·resent w'as
mrude· 1t1rat 'the. tria1 of the, sai·d c'au:s~e,'he continue!d
to the month of January because of the period
prior to Ch'rts'tma.s heing 'an inconV'enient time for
the defendants involved in the ~aclti'On, theo 1said
triai having theretofore been set ro'r the 12tth day
of Dec;emher, 1949, which motion wa,s oln D·eeemiber
5, 19·49·, at ~a further pre-1Jri'a!l hearing of S'aid cause
denied hy s·aid Judge an'd ~the caus~e set for trial
on December 27, 1949 ; 1th'at on illre ,s,aid 5th da~ of
D1ecemher, 1949, art a fll'lthe1r pre-:triial hearring the
~s,aid Judge: permi:tt~d the pillaintiff to fille: a moti:on.
to amend its 'third 'amended compl~aint rtlrerettlofore
filed herein an d ·set sai:d motion, on th:~e·e days
nortJ.ce, ro~ he'aring; th~aJt 'OU a further p·re-triaJ.
hearing 'of said ·caU!se· he~d on Decemb~r 9, 1949,
1

1

1

1
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the said Ju.dge gr,anted p·laintiff's moltion to further 1amend its thir'd amended eomp~aint, denied
to the: ~de(~en!d!ant:s, Z. C. M. I. and Grayhar Eie~tric
C'omp·any theiT' 'alsser:te'd rights. to file counte-rcilJaims herein, and ·a;t. the request of the attorn:eys
for 'the p[aintiff sno·rtened def·end:an!ts.' 'S'tatutoey
time within which to answelr the third arneln!ded
· comp·~aint ~as furthle1r atnen:de'd 'on said day, re·quil'ing said ~deren1d!ants to p·lead .thereto hefiore
F-ri!day, Deeemher 16·, 1949; that :on 'a furltheir pir&triaJl hea:r.ing 'of s:aid caus~e~ held on Decemiber 16,
1949·, the said Judge, although s~ai!d caus'e was not
:at is'sue, denie'd the motion of defendant, Graybar
Electric ·Comp,any th·at the cause he continued rO:r
trial Ito s·om·e: :date heyon'd D·ecemiber 27, 1949,
o'rdereld \the he:aring on th·e demur'relr:s of the· defendants, L,eJ~an'd B. Flint, F[in~t DisrtrihUJting ·Comlplany, Ree·d Bige[nw, The P!aris Comp,any and Z.
·C. M. I., which demurre!rs were filed at the· time
of 's:aid pre-triJa[ heM'ing, und fiorthwith an'd pre~
functoril.y o~ertrul~d lthe sam~e, denying at s aitl
time a motion. to 'S'trike like,wise f:i!led on said day
by the srai:d !defend~aD!ts, Leland B. F1int an'd Flint
Distrl!bu!ting ·Comprany, and at s~a.jjd time~ :denied the
mo t:iJon. of tihe d·e£enidan!ts Le~and B. Flint and
Flint Dils·tributing iC ompany tha;t the cause be
s1tricken firom the trhtl :Calendar on the ground
itliat tire· Srame wa:s not ~at issue, and the~reupon
o:rde!reld ail of the· ·defendan·ts no1t p·revious~y
·answe1ring to the ·third runen:d8ld comp~aint as
further amenJdeid to ·do ·S:O on, and in some instan-ce's heforr-·e, the 20th 'd!ay of Decemhe'r, 1949;
rfuat the mrutteJriS and things. h·e1rein'alb'OiVe~ set ftorth
~anid the 1a£ore s!aid raciliions1 10[ saiJd Judge w·elfle aJ..l
made and h!a!d over the 'Oibdections 10[ the: defentlants. and exc:ep1ttons iduly 'taken therelto; ·that refer1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1
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enoo is hereby made t'o tlte record and files in the
above entitled eause and by 1such refeTence the
s·ame wre made a part hereof for all pru'rpioses.
'' Tha~t the undersigned affian1Js, th•e sai'd 'attOTn.eys, verily be}ieve that lthe p1rejudice an·d bias
of the said Judge is shown 'by the ·capricious, arbitrary and pre-emptory conduct aforesaid and his
bias in £avor of th·e plaintiff is ap~p1arent, an~d ·affiants verily believe that the defendants re~tt'e,..
s·ented by tltem respe~tivelly cannoit ~have .a f,air an{i
impartialtriaJ. ·on the merits of s•aid ~acti'on lbefoT'e
sraid Judge.
''This affidavit is m'rude pursu:ant ~to subdivis~on Ch) of Rule 63 of the Utah Rules of Civil.
P:vocetdure in effect on J·am.uary 1, 1950, •and in
making this ~affidavit and ~as a p·art thereof the
unijffio:signed aJttorne:ys repi-·es:en.t th!at the, slaid
affidavit and the rap~plicrub.ion in connection theT'ewith rare maJde in go1o1d faith.
'' Wh'erefore, ~all the ;defendants named in the
·aJbove entitled caus'e by an!d th-rough theiT under~
srigneJd attorne"Jls p·ray ~rua;t the saiu Judge, the
HonJoraJble J'O'S'eph G. J e:pp~son., shall he· disqu a1ified ·and sh'all!l p•roceed no further helr~in ·except
to eau1s'e the said ~action to be heard an!d delter:rnined b,y ranortheir Judge: Within saild D1stricft. ''
1

1

'The 'affi!davit was refl]sed and th'e Judge faile'd to
dris~quailiify htims elf for th'e r~8JSIOIJliS, 8 0 raJr 'BJS can be
gaJthe:red from tire reeord, (1) tlraAt the· lde~£enldan,ts made
no 'sih!oiWing tnaJt there waJs another judge avail,aJble ready
to handle the matter, ('2) exp,ens,e· to the, ~county, (3)
n;othlng ·app'e'are'd in the uff~davit that ·eould n'ot have
1
been p~reiV'iorus~ly ~al'led 'to tlre ;court's attenltion, and ( 4)
1

1

I
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that the ~appllication of rule 63 (h), un de·r which the, affi1davit was made, ~omd not, be feaJsd.b:le ·an'd would work
injustice un!der rule 1 (h) (;T r. 443 to 460.)
1

1

It is. conten'ded that the bias ·and p'rejudiee. as,se~rted
by the: •aff~daVit ·fin!ds ~omirmrution in the ·o~de·r granting
the new trial as to these ·ap·p'ellants, which bia1s ·anid prejudice was: evidenced throughout the trial.
Judge J·epp,son having deni:ed de.£endanlts' appliC'ation for his disqualification, rt:cial began befiore hlm ·anti
a jury on J,anu:rury 3, 19·50, ·and was concluded on FebruaJry 4, 19'50. On :and hetween the!se days twen1ty ·days· we~e
actually COD!SUmed in the, trial :of the. issu·e S. A:t the CllOS'e
of 'the evideU:ce, and after Jboth sU.·des hrud rested, e•ach of
the 'defe·ndan!ts pr~s.enteld lan:d ~argued ·a motion. fior {}i, reeted verdict. ·Corl.llfsei for plaintiff confessed the motrons of Wa!rren ·a:nd Co:on. The court denie!d ·all other
moitions ~and sent the case to the jury. Befor'e the cruse
went 'to the jury the cour't. receive:d fTom ·all p1arties their
reque1s1t1s for instructionlS. The1~eaf1Je·r extenlded disc1]ss.ion!s. were b:aJd by the: court and ·cJormsel for the consi'deration of reque,sts iand 'Of '·the. court's P'ropolsed instruC!tiolJl'S.
It willlik!elly ibe· convenient £or 'the~ ·court if we set dorwn aJt
this point (ce'!4tain p1ortion1s of 'the. instructions which ~are
particu!la:rly germane to 'Our 'argument. Such iDistructions were given f'o:r the ~rurpos.e: of applying the rule
of law which ·I'Iequi'res th~at the ·exi'S'tence of 'a conspiracy
mus1t he es:t;aJblish~d, if ·at all, by c;lear and eonvineing
evidence:
1

1

1

1

'' Irnstruction. No. 3 (portions)
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''You are instructed that the existenc-e of a
conspiracy is neVler p'resumed. It may, however,
:be pro,re'd ·by cir:cumstanrtiaJ evid·ence. ~The P'laintiff has the iburden of proving th'at 'a conspiracy
exis,ted ·and not only hy a. p·reponderamce of the
evidence but by evidence that is 'Clear and convincing . . . Therefo're, uniess you 'are satisfie·d
by clear ;an;d convinc.in·g ·evi'den·ce th~at 'a consp:i'racy
eristed, you must find in faV~or of 'all of the defendants and agains!t the plarl.ntiff, no cau'se of
acti<>·n.
''Whether you contsider the ·acts of the defendants to he 'lawfllli. or unlawfu'l would m1ake
no difference if there i's no clear ~and convincing
proof of a eombinati!on o~r understanding ·among
some :or all. of ~the defen·da.nts, to eontro[ p:r~ces o~
limit phllintiff's supp'ly of me'rehandi'Se in re~
str3rlnt of trarle, because in the ,a:bse~nce of such
!pl"oof the plaintiff canno1t re.cove-r.
1

'' Y'Ou aTe further ins-tructed th:a;t 1fue, bur~de:n
is upon plaintiff to proVJe by clear ~and convincing
evi·dence thrut each 'One, orf the defendants knowingly and intentJional1y joined in the conspiracy,
U you. S'hould find thelre was a ·CiOUSpiiracy, ~and if,
as to ~any ·defendJaiDt, p·l!aintiff ha:s fai~l~d to p~oVle
by clear ~and convincing ~eiVidence- thart such defendant has so jotine'd a ·conspiTacy, then yom·
verdict must he in fiaVJor of such defen dant and
against plaintiff, no cau's'e of action.''
1

'' Iwstruction No. 8 N (Poritions)
''In order to prove a conspirajcy hy circumstanti~all 1e~dence there mu,s~t he substantial p:r'oof
of circumsrtJance1S from which it may he reas'ooobly
inferred that a corrsp[racy existed. It cannot be
es'ta:blished hy conj~ec:ture and. speculaltron alone,
1
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but 'the proof must ~be CJlear and convincing, and
if the facJts. :and cir~cumstanees. relie:d upon 'are as
consistent with a lawful p·u:rlpose ·as with ran u.ni'awful rmde:rtaking they are not sufficient to esta'bli1s1h·a ·con·spri:racy.''

''Instruc·tion No.

11

''While it is neces'sa;ry in or.der to e'stablish
the exis.te~nee of 'a conspiracy to p,rove1 by C!Lear
and convincing ·evidence given in the cause, 'a comfblination. of two or more p~ers1ons hy ~onceTt of
a<5tion to aceomp,lish the alleged wrongful pUTp1ose, Jie't it i!s not neeess1ary to p~rove thait the
con:spi:vators came together and entered into a
fiormaJl agreemenJt to ef£ect thtat purpo:se. Such
common designs and purposes may he proved by
·circumstantial evidence. 'Such common designs
may he regarded as proved if you believe from
clear and ~onvincing evidence given in the cause
that the parties to the conspiracy were actually
pursuing in ·concert the common design or purp~ose, whether BJcting separately or together, by
common or different means, if such common or
different means all were leading to the same
unlawful ·result.
''In thi!s -<~JonnecJtion you rure in1s1tructed that
if you find from ·Cilear 'and ~convincing eVidence
thitt 'two or morte of the ~defrendants were, actually
pursuing 1in eoneert a eommon de1s ign to fix and
reguilirut.e p:rice~s in 'S1alt Lake City on melrchanldis,e·,
then rsuch 1de.fen.dants. S'O a1cting in ·Concert would be
con:spliring !and ;confederating ror SUCh prurpiO'S!eS.
For a consp~i'ra.cy :to ·exi:slt the:ve: need he no forma11.
meeting n.f the ~onspi'rators or 'any formal agreement, but it i:s 'suffi-cient if p~ers'ons !act in concert
to aooompJi:sh. ·th·e purpoS'es lrere~in sp1eeified. ''
''Instruction No. 30 ( P'ortion1s)
1
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"Unless you al'Je· satisfied 'by clear and convincing evidenee, and hy a pre·pon;derance of all
of the evidence, tlhrut 'th·eire. was a eonsp~racy
formed and :carried out 'as alleged in pl,aintiff''S
comphllint, yoll 'viii be nequired to find in faVJor
of the defendiants .an'd ugainst the p laintiff, no
cause of action. ''
1

Having he-ard the instructions of the court, the jury
retired and thereafter return·ed with its unanimous verdict !agalinst th,e plaintiff and in favo1r 'of al!l defendan'ts,
including these appeilanrts (Tr. 142, 143).
On the 15th ~day 'Of February, 1950, p,l,aintiff filed its
motion for a new tria[. On September 5, 1950, Judge
Jeppsnn rule'd upon the motion f01r new tria[ in this
language:
'' T·he ~a:ho;ve ~enti,tled eruse, having 1been he,reltofore taken under ·a~dviS'e·ment to this date, and the
·Court having con's~de1red and he~ng fu!lly advised
in :the p·remise,s, :it is or de'r,ed that defendants'
moltion •to 'strike the :affidavit of Bryant G. B:adgeT
i,s ·dem~d. I~t is further ~orr'dered tha:t pilaintiffs'
motion for a new ~tr~al against th'e ;defendanJts
Graythar El,e·etric Comp:any, a corpor,ation, Z. C.
M. I., a eorrporation, an!d Sa:l~t Lake H·ar:dware
Comp,any, ·a eorp'Oiriation, is denied. It i s further
ordered that pl'arintifrs ' m·o:tion for 'a new trila;l
against tthe defendants: Lelan;d B. Flint, The
:F1lint D~strlibuting ·Comp~any, a corpo~ation; R.eed
Bigelow, The· P~ari1 s C·ompany, a co1rpor:rution; 'and
Rolbert Nevins is he,reby g:rantred on the gr'orun:ds
that the verdiet :i!s -a.gaillJst lthe weight of the -evidence 1and rtha,t a new trial i's r~equi'red to prevent a
milsearrirage of j usti.ce. ' ' {Tr. 161) .
1

1
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We -are .s·eeking to reVlef!se that ordeT and to reinstate the ve,rdiet of the jury.

The points relie d upon by ap·pellants are specified on
pages 8 and 9 of their petition for ~app;eaJl. Mlof those
~1orints, will he covereid in ·this argument. The· poin1tS will.
be pre,serited here in an o:rder different than th~at. in which
. they ,a;re 'listed in ·the· p~etiti;on, and will he somewhat recrust, regrorupe·d and conso~idruted.
1

I.
(a) The order ap·p·e.aled fr'Om shows. upon its face
that ·there is. an inV'alid usurpation of power not v:ested
in the trial Judge hy statu'te or app[i·ooble ruile of civril
proceduTe.
(b) 'Th:e recor:d will show that the:re is no sufficient
or .any gTOnnd upon Which the trial court could le·galiy
grant a new 1triail as against any nf these ap~pelilanrbs.
The rtria.Jl court as,signed aJs. his. :rtea:son for grantting
a new tri'a!l ' 'lthat the verdict i1s against the· weighlt o[
the :evide·nce, and tha1t a new trial is1 required to prevent
·the miscarriage of justice. ' '
Th~s.

is. equivalent, in the lighlt of the Rule's of Civi~
Proce!dure ·to ·saying that the ve~rdi~cit i~s against the weight
of the eviden-ce, wher'ef o~re 'a new triai is neces,S'all'y to p(f·event a miscarriage of justice·.
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'The grounds upon which a new tri'al m:ay be grante~d
after verdict 'Of the jury a.~e limited to Ruile 59 (a) and
(d)·. They rea:d aiS follows :
'' (a.) Grounds. ~suhjec.t 1Jo the p~ro~isions of
Rule· '61, ·a new trial may be grante!d to all or any
·of the partie1s and ~on afll or P'art of the· i'ssues.,
for any of the £oliowing caU!s:es ; p·roiV'i!ded, however, •that on ·a moltion for a new trial in an ·action
tried without a jury, the· court may open the judgment if. one h~as he en entered' take a:ddi'tional testimony, amend findings. of fact ·and conclusions of
law ocr.- make new findings and conCJlusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment:
'

.

(1)

Irregularity in the p;r,oceedings of the
~orurt, jury or adverse party, or !any orr deT of the
court, or libuse of ·dis-cretion by which erther p•art,y
was p reven1Je,d from having a Eair trial.
1

1

('2) . Misconduct of the jury; and when.eve:r
·any one or more 'Of the jur,ors have 'he~en induced
to 'as1sen1t to 'any genel}al or ·speeiai verdict, 'Or to a
finding on ·any ques~tinn submitted to them hy the
ooru:rt, by resort to a 'determination b·y ehance or
as a result of bribery, ~suCJh miseonduct may he
proved :by the affidavit of 'any one of the juror's.
('3)
1pii"Uden;ce~

Acci'dent or surp ri'se, which or~dinary
Ciould n·o:t have guarde·d against.
1

('4)! N·ewly diseovered evi!dence, materia[ for
'the party malci.ng fue ~ap~pliootion, which he could
not, with re~~soD!ahle diligence, have dis~CJo~ere'd
an·d p!'lo,duced ~a:t the tria[.
(!5) Exce's~sive 'Or UI!ade:quate ·damages, ap~
pearing 1t:o h:aVie he~en given un·der the influence
of pas'sion or p·reju!di'ce.
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('6} fusuffi1CJiency oif the: evidence to justify
the verdi!ct ;or other :decision, o·r thrut i't i1s against
~aw.

(7)

Error in law.

"'(d) On Initiative of C10urt. Noltlater !tlhan
10 days a~ter entry of judgment the corurt of its
own initia:tive· may orde:r a new triai on motion of
a pa;rtty, ~and in the orr,der sh:all sp:ecify the gr'ounds
therefor. ' '

The record wil.l'show that ~a veTdict of the, jury was
received 'on February 4, 1950. ·The· orde·r granting a new
trial was m:ade ·se:v-en mon'ths 'lalter, on Sept.emhe'r 5, 1950.
It is pJali.n, 'then, 'thaJt Ru[e ·59(d) i s enti'rely inapp[licalble
to tills cruse. On 'September 5, 1950, the trl'al J udgte wrus
wi·thout jurisdiction to exercise uny power under Rute·
5·9(d)'.
1

:The iJ'rovi!si!ons, of Ruie 5·9 (a) (l), (2), (3), ( 4), (5)
and ('7)' were -clearly not invok~d hy the: trial Judgte· in
~support orf his orde·r. Tills le·a:ves for con:s~deration only
5'9'(a) ( 6), ,an,d only the' fir:st p al'lt of that suhs·ection could
be of 'any 'sign~ficanee :he.re beCJause· 'there is not eiVen a
hint in the Judge'''s order "t~ha;t the· verdict i!s again'st
law."
1

Our inquiry i s there.for'e' limite~d to rthat portion of
59('a) (6) which authoriz·els a nerw 'tria[ for ''insufficiency
of the evidence to jus1tify the ver:diclt. '' The court did not
set rbhe ve:rtlielt :alsti.'de for insufficiency of the, evitlence
to :suppoi:rt i!t, !hut fbeeause he ·eon'ceived th!at the ve~dict
was 'against the ·Weight ~of lthe evidence. Un!derr the I;aw
in thiJs p·articu1ar case, the orde'r comp~laine~d of is invalid
1

1

1
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in this :ca:se for 1two reasons : ( 1) there is no authortity
in rule or 'statute for ·setting asi'de, a V'e'rdict 'because the
trial Judge thinks it is ·against ithe weight ~of the evi'dence;
an'd ('2) !because these defendants were ·c[harged With
fraudulent conspiracy, a:nd their liability or not wa.s not
left to delp1end upon the weight or p~reponder:ance of the
evidence, 'hut could be esta:blished 'and found to exist only
upon ''-elear and convincing ·ev:iJdenee. '' This a;spieet of
the ~se wili he p~resente'd and ·argued in full detail in
a subsequent 'S'ecti~on of 1thi1s brief. Suffribe it ~to s~ay here
thaJt 'the Judge instructed 'the jury thait they could find
defendants guilty only up'on proof that i's elear ~and convincing. 'H·aving ·aJpplied tthrut rule as fixing the quality
of proof nooess,ary to suppo'rt a ve;rdict agamslt the
defendants, his OTder th:at the ver'dictt in favor of defend\

ants wa;s against tJhe weight of the evidence shows upon
its race 1JhaJt i t WaJS /Lacking in the subs:tanee ~and vitality
1

nece'S Saxy m'Setting aside the verdict.
1

It will he ·remembered '·tha.t P'laintiff ',s moti'On for a
new trial ·assigns alll o[ the grounds authorized by the
1

Rules of Civil Pro'cedure·, an'd s'Ome grounds niOit so
aufuoirized, but the or,der of the· court 'shoiWs th'at ilt wrus
not hased upon any groun'd 'Sp·e:cifi~d in the Tule s. When
viewe1d in the ii~ht of plainrtiff',s third 1amended compl,aint, 'a1s. 1amended, the :S'everal an1swers iOf the defen1d1

)

an!ts, and !the instructions, of 'the court, the or1de1r setting
as['de the ve'rdict s~hould f:all of its orwn inhe ren,t weakness.
1

P 1aintiff ~charged 'a frau'dulent
1

consp~ir'acy

and ·demanded
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treble •damages therefor. ·The an1sw·e'rs ·denied the ex~s'tence of :any ·CJonsp[racy. The insitru0tions :directed the
jury thrut a conspiracy eoul1d nott he found ito exi:s:t upon
the 'simple weigf.ht or p:reponderance of ·the. evi'dence,
hut only upon ~lear and convincing evidence. The jucy
fnund 'defendants not gui·lty, and the verdict wrus, .set
rus:i!de 'as '' 'agains't the, weight of tbhe evidence. ''
1

We aTe aware of the analysis made hy this. courtt in
King v. U. P. R. ·Oo., 2.12 P. ('2d) 692 to determine "the
bre~adth of the· 'trial (~orur't 'is. di:sicretion in granting a new
trial,'' bU!t thalt ca:se an1d all the cases revi·ewe'd th'erein
are ·Cilearly distingllis.hruble from the in!s'tant caJse, !aJs, rto
the grounds upon whiclh 'a new trial was grante'd. Beginning with the eas·es reviewe·d in the King ease we find the
f'olfiorwing grounds :S'tated :as. ·a 'basi's fbr a new trial:
1

J,ames

V'.

Robertson, 39 U. 106-8, 117 P. 1074, g~ound:
\

''The: eviden'c.e did nott justify th·e: ver'di·ct in
favor of ithe reslpon:de~t. ''
OU!r new rule 59{a) [·s :aJs, fol•lows: "Insufficiency of
the eviden!c.e to ju,stify the verdiet. ''
If there· is a difference in :the two startements it is
unimporitanrt now.

Valiotis v. Utrah-Ap,ex, 55 U. 151, 184 P. 802. ·This
court 's'taJted 11he grounds as follows:
''It will he perceived that ·counsel fior -app~el
l~ant do no:t contend that 1:Jheire, was. no evidence to
1sup·piort rtJhe verdicit, but tha.t the verdict is so p~alp
ably ag1ainst the clear weight of the evidence BJs to
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indicate tlrat the trial court abuseld its discre'tion
in refusing to grant a new trim. In other words,
we are asked to review the weight of the evidence. '' (Italics ours)
In disposing of ''weight 'Of evidence'' as a ground
for ~a new trial, this ~~ouTt in the Valiotis oose ~said:
' ' To set 'B.Jside the verdict in ;such ~a ca!se would
be to invaJde rtilie province of the jury, in whom i S
ves·t~d tfue power to decide all questions. of fact
and to whom all evidence thereon is to be addressed.''
1

In this case ·a clear distinction irs maJde between the
unauthorized grorun!d that the ve rdict is againis1t the
weight of the evidence an:d the ground tbat there is :a legal
insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict. Further in the V alio'tis :CBJse rtfu.ere appe aJr S:
1

1

1

''This. ;court ha!s repeatedly he'ld that the discretion 'Of rbhe tria!l C!OU.rt, ·exe:vei'se d in granting or
refusing to ~anrt ~a mo;t:iJon for a new trial, b·ased
on the insufficiency of the evi·dence vo justify the
verdict, cannot be interfered with whe1n, upon examin~aJtion 'of the evidence a:s d!isclosed b~ the
recorrd, i~t is apil1arent 'tlrat there is ~a Subs'tantial
conflict of 'Hvidence as to m~ate~rial is~sues of f:aCJt
in the ,caJse relative to which the in'sufficiency i s
alleged. ' ' (Irta1ics orurs)
1

1

1

1

In tJhe abOive ·ea;se·, as in the eruse· at (bar, the~ ground
relied upon waJs '''tJhat the ve~rdic.t was again!st the wei~h·t
of rbhe evidence·'' :and this ·Ciourt clearly he1d that such
was not .a p1rop~er groun'd upon which to !base an order
granting a new trial.
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we rare :awa:re of no u.tah ease granting a new trial
on the sole grrownd that the verdict is ag~amst th.e weight
of the evidence, .and under ·the· new rulers, the~ eourt !aCJting
on its ·own initirutive i!s limi ted to the grorund1s avati.la:bJe
to rt\he morving pa:rrty in ;ordering a new trial. The~ grounds
set fortJh in the new rules for granting 'a new ·trial are
broad enough to ·Clover every kind of injustiee that may
result from ra verd~~ct lan!d rtlie prarty againlst whom the
order f.or a new 'tr~'al runs, ·as, wellas the appellate court,
irs entitle d ~to know from what unlawful ae!t or thing the
injustice arises.
1

1

1

It may be admitted ~thrut some· confusion app·e'ars in
judicia[ ldeei·si!on~s a.ttemptin.g ·to cle,a.riy defline the p'riOvince ·of the eourt rand 'nhe prrovince o.f the jury, in a jury
trial, but in ·the last anal~si·s i t mu:st he held that 'statutory rules mean ·something or the~ mean nothing.
1

If 'a ·tri:ai ·eourt -can 'say and get away with it, ''I oTder
a new tria;! beeau se my 'sense of ju'stiee· is. offended,'' or
''that the jury mis:aprprehendeld or ignored the weight of
the :evidence,'' then the ;rules meran nothing, ibeCiaUrSe they
a;re [compJeterly ignored, an'd the finding of ra jury upon
any i'ssue in ·any ~ea1se is simpJy ·advirsory, to he aecepted
or rej eeted at wi'll hy tJhe tri,a:l judge.
1

1

1

If it fbe! 'though1t th1a,t the- Ciourt has power to .grant
new triall s: ·for rerus'on1s nolt s~tated in tlhe statutes or rule'S,
then ~again, ~the ruies mean. n!othing, heeau'Se i.f he cannot
find :a ground s.taterd in the· rule'S. he m'ay 'Su1bver1t them
by res-o,rt to hlrs rsense of jU!stice, wh·ieh sometime!s, though
not always, irs ba1sed upon a p~rejudiced vie·w of the
1

1
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situation. The sta:tutes 'v-e-re p:als s.e'd and the rule's were
made with ·a view to p'roviding grounds for the c101rrect!i·on
of all injustices, and .aJll the eourt need do to in'sure. jru's·tice
1

is to base his order upon 1Uhe :app:ropriate strututory
grorund or ground~s if such exist.

We ·submit that if injustice i's. invoJved in the ve·rdiet
in ·the ins,tant -ca.Jse, it ·eould have been 'state1d as ·some
omis'sion, mis·conduct, or other matter-s enumerated in
rule ·59. But ~since no ·strututoTy ·grounds h·ave ·heen 1stated
it must be assumed that 'the court found no statuto'ry
ground upon whiclh ·he eou'ld ,clearly ·base his. order and,
therefore, relied on the language of some eourt:s to the
effrect thaJt 1fue '' weiglht ·of the e:vi dence'' might he one
of the elements -considered in determining whether there
i!s rnsuf£icJiency 0rf the ·e:vi!dence to jus.tify •the. Veirdict, but
1

1

as 'S'hown in the V aliotis

~ase,

SUpT a, granting ·a new triai

1

1

on the ground '''thait the verdict is 'SO P'rulp 1afb~y again~st the
cleaT weight of the evidence . . . would fbe, to inva:de tihe
province of the jury, in WflOID is Vested t!he plOWer to
decide

~all

questions of fact and to whom :a:ll evidence

thereon i:s to be addres'setd. ''
But in no event ·CJan King v, U. P. R. Co., 212 P. ('2d)
692 sustain 'the order here comp[~ained of. Th·e;re tb:e
i'S'SiUes were

~to

be deitermined upon the simpJe weight oT

preponder'ance: of the evidence. while here Plaintiff collll!d
prev~ai·l

'Omy UpOn 'Cilear and convincing evidence.
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II.

Ca)

The reeo:vd ,s(horws that plaintiff failed to prove
by ~clear and ·convincing evidence th~at a eorrslpti.Tacy eve·r
e~i!sted :among ~th·e defendants, or any of them, and the
record ·cle·arly ·shows ·tltat the jury was not -convinced iby
plaintiff's evi'dence.
('h) The record shows th,at Rs a matter 'Of law there
wa;s never any ·eonsp,Iracy among the defendantls·, Oil"
any of them.

(c) 'The· record shows tihaJt :the verdict of ~the jury
1n f:aVJor orf the defendants doe's not constitute :a miscarriage of justice·.
(d) 'The record ISlh!orws 1Jhat ra verdict finding the
existence :of a ~onspiracy would have been without suhstanti,a1 or p·roibrutive support, and would h~ve heen a
misea;rriage. of jus:tice.
Points II (~a), (h), (c)· :and (d) s·et for'th !aboiVe. wiH be
argued together.
The ·defendants in ~this ca!s'e' represent tWJo groups:
di'strihutJ01rs: who 'sold their merchandise at who~esa1e for
re's'aJ.e by deah~r~s, and ·dealer;s who purC!hrused me·rch;an ..
disH from distri!bu!l1ors and T'eso[d it at retail ·to the consuming pu!hlic. Defendants Graybar Ele·ctric Comp,any,
Flint Distributing ·Comp1any, Z. ·C. M. I. :and Salt Lake
Hardware Comp;any were rdistribrutoT'S. Defendants O:rvi1
C. Coon, Frank Warren, Robert Nevins, Reed BigeJow,
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E. M. Royle Comp~any, arrd The Pari·s ~C 1omp1any we're
dealers. Defendant Le~land B. Flint was p~re1sident o.f
Flint Di's tributing Co.
E~ach

distributor denied i1hat i~ts busine~s~s decisions
'vith relation to plaintiff had heen brought ~bout, or in
any manner influence1d, 'by anything said, done or omitted
by 'any other ~distributor, or by :any dealer. · E~ach dea!ler
denied that he induced or atte:rrup1ted to ind-uce any di'StriJbutor to deal or not to ~deal with pl~aintiff. Each dealer
compl'ained ·to Glenn Earl about the vi·olrution of. the
~air T~ade

laws ·by the pJ:aintiff, and

th~e

defendant

dealers, and 0tlher dealers in RCA I"eeords, met together
to discus-s their rights un·der fue Fair T'rade L~aws.
1

T:he Courrt instructed tlhe jury that ea0h ·de,aler h~d
the right to 1SO comp!lain, and th'at, if the ~dealers believed
there was ·a violation of the F;air Tr,ade laws, they h:ad a
right to ~as'Semble for 'a discus,sion of such vi'O'lation. Th1o1se
instructions are correct srbatements of the law app1licabJe
to 'the is sues, ·and the corurt in his order granting a new
1

tr1al found no fault with them.
E;a0h defendant spe:cifi,cally denied the exis1tence of
any conspiracy, an'd ·eaeh denied partic.ip1ruti'On in any
concerted ~act!s dHsigned to injure plaintiff. E·rueh defendant ful'ly
and

exp~lained

lawfu~ly

his

~conduct,

and set forth logicailly

his rerusons therefor. And ·the jury had the

right :to !believe defendants' tes1timony.
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As pointed out above, the couTt instructed the jury in
Ins'truction N10. 8 N illrrut, ''A eon's piracy .cann'ot he estalb'
~ishe'd by ·conjecture ·and ·speeulation alone,
but p~roof
must he: clear and convincing, and if the facts and circumstances relied upon are as consi stent with :tJhe lawful a;s
wiJth tJhe uni:awful undertaking they are not sufficient to
estaJbli'sh !a eons~piraey. '' 'Sru;ch being the ~law the jury wrus
bound to find in favor of defendants, and a contrary
finding would :have been without substantial or p~roibative
evidence, and would have worked an injustice. In hi's
ruling up,on the motion for .a new :tri'ai the court fiorund
no fault with the instructions given.
1

1

I

'Tihe cltse of the de'fendan:ts was strong enough to
absolve them from the C!harge of eon'spira;cy as a matter
o;f law. 'T'he !burden of pironf was upon the piliaintiff, and
we· ~desire to demons!trate that plaintiff''S C)ase was ·entirely 'lacking in that quality nece,ss1ary ·to make it clear
and convincing to 'any unbiased mind. On the other hand,
plaintiff's ~ase w~s of ~sueh a sihaJbby qu~li ty ws to require
rej·ection in the mind of any unhiase~d p·erson.
The ·trial court ruled tha:t th:e, j·ury 's verdict wrus
'':against the weight of fue evidence'' and theref.ore ''a
misearri·age of justice.'' '' The weight of the evidence'' is
a s·tandar'd ·clearly not app,lieab[e :tn this crus,e. The court,
1

in full accord with the law upon the subject, ins.trueted
the jury that defendants could he found gui·lty of con'spir~cy only upon "e1ear and eonvincing evidence,"

which i1s :a :different :and higher standar:d than' 'weight of
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the evidence.'' \The ·court gave the jury t\he~ ~orrecrt
standard and :then 'arrOiga;te~d to him's elf the ·right to ap~[y
a different standard and iby i.ts ap1plication wip1e orut th·e
jury's verdict.
Note again that in Inst~c:tion No. 3 this ap·p·ears :
"'The p11aintiff has the burden of pTorving that a conspiracy existed ~a.nd not only by a p~re·ponde:rance of the
eviden~e but by evidence that is clear and convincing.''
By that charge 'the court :denied th~~ jury the· right to
find con1 sp~ra:cy by ''a preponderunee of the evidence,''
but after the jury had foun~d a verdict in ~a~cordance with
h~s instructions he 1set the verdict aside by resort to the
very standard he ~bad forbidden the jury to empJoy.
1

The very nature of a conspiracy ea:se calls for the
application of the rule that p~roof must he ~by clear an'd
convincing evidence. The p:en-alties for·civil conspiracy are
far more severe th:an tho se· in the ordin~ary ~:ivil damage
cases. A finding of conspliracy not only fixe S the brusis
for liahility for ·aill ·damage1s suffered, but subjects the
defendants to trehle ·damage. In addition to 'all this, a
corpo;ration is \Sillbject to the· forfeiture of its coTpo;rate
charter, whieh, as to any ;such corporation found guilty
would he a de~ath sentence.
1

1

Beeause of the penaltie~s impos-ed it is altogether
approp1riate~ that the ·Courts. do ~and should Tequire: proof
of the exiS'tence1 of a eonspir~cy iby clear ~and convincing
evidence.

Abbo:tt v.

Mille:~

et

~al,

41 S·.W. ('2d) 89 9

!(Mo.).
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"Berore plaintiff was entitled to recover, it
was neee,ssary that sihe make· out her ease '·by clear
and 'Convincing evidence.' Walsih c~se, supra. This
she failed to do, and the request of the Gregg
Realty Comp1any for a directed y.erdict should
have been granted.''

Burkholder -et al., v. Westmorela!Jid Coun.ty
Inst. Dist .. et al., 68 Atl. (2) 436, ·(Pa.)
decided in 19'49.
"When ~eonsp~iracy i!s alleged, it must be
proven by full, ;clear and satisf'a:ctory evidence,
and wh:en 1p[1aintiff .also re~ies upon 'Subsequent
acts to es1JaJhlish eons,pirwcy, the acts must be sueh
as cle~arly indicate· p1rior co~lusive combination and
fraudule·rrt purpose, not slight circumstance of
·suspicion, and the subsequent -acts must he such
as to warrant helief and justify con,clusion that
;s'll!bsequent (acts were done: in furthe·rance· of the
unlawful combination -and in pursuance of scheme
to wreck the business and cause the bankruptcy.''
1

· Quackenlbvttsh et al., v.
B31 (Wash.).

~8Zate

et ·al., 121 P. (2d)

:Suit for damages for conspiracy to
ment di'Smi'S!sing comp~aint. Affirmed.

~defraud.

Judg-

Headnote 1 reads:

''1. In 'an action for conspiracy to

def~aud

p~laintiffs

of ·an interest in 'a mine, to es!tahlish the
'conspi:rrucy' plaintiff must 'show ·by clear and convincing ~evidence that defe·ndants combined, in furtheran-ce of a p~re-\Gonceived pJ·an, unlawfully to
deprive p~aintiff'S of their interest in the mine,
:and that overt acts. were done in 'accordance with
the p~an to their d'amage. ''
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He'adnote 2 read'S :
''2. In an action for consp;iracy to defraud
pl,aintiffs of an interHsrt in a mine where p~ain
tiffs' evidence disclosed acts of the defendants
which were as consistent with the l~awful purpose
of proteeting defendants' interests as they we:r·e
with the unlawful purpose of conspiring to defraud p~rain tiffs' evidence was. not 'Sufficient under
requi}}ement for cle'ar and convincing p~roof of the
elements of conspiracy.''
Tlhe court says, page 333 :
'''The main queistion for our consideration is,
whether or not V ervaeke and Slate conspired to
defraud ·and ·deprive ·appellants of their interest in
the mine through the termination of the option
contracts. Since this is a question of fact, we
s'hall detail the evidence which each side pfroff.e·red
to ·sustain its contention. In weighln.g the facts.,
·however, illle rollowing rules must be kept in
mind. Appellant must p~rove that Ve~aeke and
Slate :combined, in furtherance. of ,a p·re-conceived
plan, to unlawfu!lly dep:rive the comp1a:ny's 'stockholders of their interest in the mine, and fuat
·oVtert acts were done in accordance with this P'lan
to their damage. 15 C.J.S., Conspir:acy, PP'· 99:61000, ;Sec. 1 to 'Sec. 6; Eyak·Rive·r Packing Co. v.
Huglen, 143 W~a:sh. 2~29, '2'25 P. 1'23, 2:57 P. 6·38, 'and
Kietz v. Gold P:oint Mines, Inc., 5 Wash. '2d ·2·24,
105 P. 2d 71. F·urthe·rmore, ap~pell·a:nt must e~staJb~
lis'h the~se ·elements hy clear and convincing evidence·. 'The evidence, moreoiVer, will be insuffi~
cient if it di'Sclose s 'aJcts as~ -consistent with a ~lawful
purpose as ·an unl'awful one. Dart v. McDonald,
107 Wash. 537, 1812 P. 6,28. ''
1

I
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R1oberts v. Saukville Cl(JJYVning Co., 2'6 N.W.
2d) 145 '(Wis.).

1
(

Suit to 'foreclose a mortgage,, counte-~l:aim for damages for eonsp,iracy, judgment on corunter~l~aim reversed.
·Court says p~.147 :·
''·A claim of ·conspiracy is a dlrallenging alle-gation, but in a civil ·action unle'ss the conspiraJCy
is est~ablished by elea:r 'and convincing e-vidence
and some a'Ct vrursuant to a formed conspiracy
;causing ·damage i'S p~ro;ven, no caus-e of :action exists. 11 Am. J ur. P. 577, Sec. 45.''

Ziegle.r v. Hustisford

F~a.rmers

Mut. Ins. Co.,

2:9'8 N.W. 610, (·Wis.).

''In -civil actions, where fraud, crime, criminal
conduct ·oT -conspiracy is alleged, the· ibrurden rests
upon him who so -charges, to esta:blish the p;r:oof of
such allegations by clear 'and 'S a:tisfructory eiVidence ... or 'by the cle~ar 1and satisf:actory evidence
to a reasonable icertainty . . . or hy clear, satis~
·fa;ctory and convincing evidence.''
1

1

!Tlra;t clHar and convin cing evidence is required to
pTove the eocistence of a eon1spira~cy is clea.rfy e'siJaJb~ished
by 'the rule's announced in the p;receding case1s. Whil·e this
court, a:s fiar as we. ·are informed, ha;s never :deeided 'a
~as:e invoiving p1roorf ·of cons:piracy, it h·as in a numbe·r
of cruses he1d ·that ''ele1ar !and convincing p1roo:f,'' or its
equivalent, described the quality of evidence neees'S~ary
to e'stabJis1h the liability of defendants in particular type's
of eases. W.e1 refer 'below to some of those cases to demonstr.ate that :all eivi1 cases are not adjudged or decided
upon the simpJe weight or preponderance of the evidence.
1

1
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And c.e-rtainly there is as 1nuch reason why p·roof of ~on
spira~.y should require clear and convincing evidence as
that ·clear :and convincing evidence should be require'd to
set ·aside ·a relea·se, or to establis h an oral trust.
1

Bu·rni·ngh~am

v. Burke et al., 67 Ut·ah 90, 2'45

P. 977.
This 'vas an action to res-cind a suhseri1ption or purohase
of capital stock :and to refover hack monies p~aid thereon.
"It is argued that the plaintiff wrus required
to prov.e his case by clear ·and convincing evi·dence.
That is true to entitle him to an adjudi!cation in
his favor on the merits, hut not to overcome a
motion for non-suit. Whether evidence is clear
and convincing requires weighing, ¢;omp·aring,
testing, ~and judging its worth wh·e·n eonsidered in
connection with 'ail the facts: and circumstance's in
evidence. ' '

Capps et al., v. Ca;pps, 110 Utah 468, 175 P.
(2d) 470.
This wrus an action to imp~o-se a trust on proceeds of a
war risk insurance policy.
"T'he 'su1bstance of the rules announce·d in
those ca!ses is th'at where a party seeks to estaiblis'h a trust by p'arol, the evidenee must he clear,
convincing and unequivocal. The evidence mus,t be
cle,ar and una.mhiguoillls. It must he convincing
and satisfy the trier of the facts that i·t is free
from fahri!cation. It must be definite, so that no
dou'bt is left as to the subject matter of the trust
or 'trust res, or the rights and obligations of beneficiaries and trustee. Testimony whlch is de:s,igned
to establi~sh ~a trust must he carefully scrutinized,
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to ascertain whether it is so attended with such
circumstantial guar1antees of trustworthiness that
it is entitled to credence.''

Ro'Senbrarug.h v. Bronc'h, 213 P. (2d) 33'3
(Utah).
Involved her-e was the reformation of a eontract on the
ground of mutual mistake.
'''The suhstantra:l question confronting us is
whether the evidence is 'clear and convincing'
as to the terms of the agreement he:tween the
p~arties tJhe,reto, whl0h te:rms were intend·ed to he
embodied in the writing subs-equently executed, so
as to over'come the presmnption that the written
in!strument correctly evidences 'SUCh ~agreement.
As to the meaning :of the !phrase 'clear and convincing,' much has been written. We shall advert
·to a few typ[cal statements ars. to the content of
that expression.
''In the case of Forrester v. ·Cook et al., 77
Utah 137, 29 2 P. 206, 209, it is said : '. . . A party
seeking relief by r:eformation of a contract Whi~h
is p·resmned to contain al1 the terms agreed upon
must estrubli'slh a mutual mistake by evidence that
is ·elear, 'S'ati,sfructory, and ~onvincing, ~and not by
a mere or a hare p~reponderance of the evidence
( c::r.rum v. Reynolds, 5'5 Uta:h 384, 18H P. 100), unless a fair preponderance of the evidence clearly
and 1satis£aetori'ly convinces the corurt o:f the
err.or .... '
1

1

''In the re eently decided ease of GrHener v.
Greener, Utah, '21'2' P. 2d 19·4, 204, 1Jhi·s coru:rt speaking through Mr. Justice Wolfe s:aid: '·That p·roof
is convinjcing whi1eh -carries with it, not only the
power to persuade 'the mind ws to the proibaJble
1
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truth or correctness ·of the fact it purports to
prove, but has the element of clinching such truth
or correctness.- Clear and convincing proofclin~hes what might be otherwise only p robable
to the mind.' See also, Nordfors. v. Knight, 90
Utah 114, 60 P. '2d 1115. With these criteria in
mind, we examine the testimony herHinabo:ve 'Set
ftortb..''
Jimeniz v. O'Brien, et al., 213 P (2d) 3'37
(·Utah).
Here we have a case ·ap:plying the clear, un-equivoC!aJl and
convincing evideniee rule to a release when it is contended that the releasing party did not have the· mental
capacity to contract.
1

' ' This requirement rthat a releruse can· be
only if the evidence i's clea.r, unequivocal
and 'eonvincing th'at it is invalid, is wel[ supporte:d
by the authorities.
"It is to he remembered that '-clear, unequivocal an·d eonvincing evi·dence,' its a higher
degree of proof than a mere 'p·}}eponderance of
the eviderice·,' and approoohes th'at degree of ptroof
required in ·a criminal 'CJase, viz., 'ib.eyond r·e:asonable doubt. '
''Proof ·iihat is c10nvincing carries ·with it,
not only the p~ower to persuade the mind as to
the truth or p~robahle correctness of the fact it
purports to p~rove·, but ~has the: e1ement of clinCJhing in the mind 'such trnth o:r 'eorre-ctne:ss . .A!s a
matter of law the !ptl'aintiff'·s evidence in thls case
fal!ls short of that 'Standard. ''
The jury, in the ~se at bar, round unanimously
that there wa;s no conspiraey, land rendered a Vie~dict
''no cause- of 'action'' ~as to all ·defen.dants.
~avoided

1
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The record will show. that there was no e:vidence
before the ·court :and jury whieh :s-quares with the standard of quality required in such c:ases. In ruling upon
the motion of plaintiff for a new trial, the trial judge
refused to be. governed hy 'the who'lesome rule which he
prop·erly imposed upon the: jury.
In view of the law of the :case, the tri·al corurt ',s
order might ·be construed as reflecting its pon~lusion
that tlhe jury was lbound ·to ·aecep't pJ,aintiff 's case as
"clear and convincing," hut sueh a conclusion is not
tena;hle 'becaus·e in ruling on the: motion for a new trial
the ·court ignore·d ·the ' ''Clear an'd -convincing'' test of the
eviden~e, and ·s.eized upon a "weight" te'st, which is
not a test under the Utruh ruJe,s, and if it were it would
amount to an ~abuse olf di:seretion 'to say that the weight
o!f the· evidence in this case favors the pJaintiff, and a
downright pervers~on of the judiciail function to ignore
ifu.e ''clear ·an~d ~eonvincing'' test imposed upon the jury
by ·the· court itself and then conclude that the plaintiff
made a ''elear and convincing'' ease: again's.t any two
or more of th~se defendants.
i

Before

~analyzing

the· te,stimony of

p~laintiff's

im-

portant witnesises, to demonstrate that the jury was not
require·d to he and ·could not reasonably he expected to
I

he 'convinced by

!p~aintiff',s

cas-e, it seems ap·propriate

to illustrate the lack of quality in pl'aintiff's cruse by
reference to some- matte·r's wthleJh affect the entire· case
land characterize the entire p:r:oceeding.
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It will be remembered that the four owners 1and
operators of p~laintiff's husine ss brought to the enterprise little, if any, ·busine'ss exp,erience. Tw01 had been
appliance S'aie!smen for ·a time, one an emp~loyee of an
accounting firm, ·and ·ifue other a hook seller. Plaintiff,
in its corporate form, ·conducted business for only a
little over 'One yea.r. During that time an important p'art
of its energies were devoted to the sale of Glenn Earl's
obsolete radios whi~h plaintiff ~alone, out of 1.7·5 de~aler's,
was willing to handle. When plaintiff, in its eorporate
capacity, ceased )busine'S!S in the early piart of 1949,
Badger 'and B~adley took over the learsehold 'an,d fix:ture s
and went right on in ·the retail applranoe business, at
the corporation'·s. old •S'tand at 38 South Main 'Street.
T·anner resumed his woTk in the aiooounting office, :and
~1cDonorugh ~again became an 'appli!an-ce salesman.
1

1

Yet, those f.our luid the~ ~extreme hardihood to come
into the trial court and ·rusk ~an award from the jury
of '$600,000.00. ·Such ~a ·demand ·coul·d he ~culated only
to stultify p~aintiff's entire ·case ~and make susp~ect the
motives and good :faith 'Of all of p·~aintiff's officers who
supported the ·demand by their testimony. The· ease
went to trial upon P'laintiff's third amended comp·laint,
as amended. ·The prayer of th~rut compJ.aint demanded
an ~award •against the :defendants, -and each of them, in
fue sum of $1,330,423..9~2. When one o:f corms~el in hi~s
opening statement wa:s aborut to mention that fantrustio
demand ·conns.el for p laintiff o bjected, ,an:d the court
1

1

·sustained the ob;jection ( T·r. 530). By then even the
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boundless avarirce of p laintiff's officers di~d not 'blind
them to the ·danger that s11;ch a demand might ibe offensive
to the jury. By 'fh!at time in th~e. p1roceedin~s the demand
of 1pilairrtiff's third .amended complaint, as amended, was
beginning ·to embarrass it's officers and counsel. Accordingly, just hefore the ea;se went to the jury the total
p1rayed for wa:s r~educed to the :smn of $600,000.00 (Tr.
2190). !The latter sum is 'as mythical, illogical and unjustified ~as the :amount prayed for earlier. ·The ·amount
of plaintiff's claim ail'on.e was: 'sufficient to completely
discredit plaintiff's case. And yet· the trial court has
ruled that unti1 ·that ~laim ·has been s'atisfied just~ce
will have mis-carried.
1

Among the defendants ~against whom plaintiff sought
to reco¥er judgment for $600,000.00 are Frank Warren
and ·Orvil C. ·Coon. At the· elo:se of plaintiff's op~ening
statement Warren and Coon moved the eourt for dismissal, whieh motion's were denied. At the: end of pilaintiff 's ease 1fuey again moved for dismis'sal, and their
motions were ~again denied (:Tr. 1'709 to 1712.). After
all the evidence was in 1and all p'arties had res,ted,
Warren and ·Coon moved for directed verdict's. Piaintiff then -confessed the motions {Tr. '2187). It thereby
admitted that it did not have, and never did haVie, a case
against either Coon or War:ren, and yet insisted upon
keep~ing both of those individuals in ·court for over a
month at grerat expense an·d sacrifice.
The. witne'sses princip,ally relied upon by plaintiff
to prove ~ons1p[ra1cy were its foour office~rs, Bradley,
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Badger, nlcDonou.gh and ·T,anner, and Glenn Ear11, the
R~C . A. man. The effect of the tri~al court's order i~s that
the jury was ·bound to find the testimony of those men
clear and convincing. True enou·gh, the court had instructed the jury that they were the exclusive judges
of the cred.i!bility of the witnes'ses, and that they coul·d
find a conspiracy to have ·existe·d only upon clear and
convincing eviden:ce, ibut he thereafter ;rule·d in effect
that after all the jury wer·e not really the judges of the
credibility of the witnesses, and after iall it wrus not really
the jury who must 1be clearly convinced, and that their
verdict must 'be set :aside as, to some defendants-not as
to others_.booause the verdi>ct was ''against the weight
of the evidence. ''
We will ·here present enough of the re-coTd to show
that the jury was not only amply justified in rejeeting
the testimony of Bradley, Badger, MeDonough, 'T'anner
and Earl, but was in good ~conscience required to do so.
Briant 'S. B·adger, President of the plaintiff, 'an·d
one of its organizers, wrus the first of plaintiff's offiC-ers
to take the witnes·s s'tand. He s·orught upon direct examination, to leave the clear imp~re.ssion in the minds. of
court and jury that ·th~e retail business in which he had
embarked had 'been destroyed 'and irrevocably }orst hecause ~certain lines 'Of merch~andise~ had heen witfhdrawn
hy Graybar Ele ctric 'Company, ·s·alt Lake H~ard\vare
Comp,any, Z. 'C. M. I. and Flint Distributing ·Comp,any.
1
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p1any, ~and empha1sized the crip·pling ·effect of the loss of
the Bendix Kelvinarbor 1and Zenith distributed by Flint.
'
It was thereafte~r
made elear fbeyond disp,ute by ~pl,aintiff's own witnes·se's that Flint Distri'buting Comp,any
did not suggest the wi'thdrawal of Zenith piroducts, ibut
on the eontr:ary urged P'laintiff to ~ontinue their purchas:e
and res'all:e '(Tr. 770, 771). It al'so was made t() 'ap·pear
ibeyond dispute, and hy pilaintiff's own witnesses, that
fue husiness ·done. by plaintiff in Zenith p~roducts far
exceeded the total business done hy p~laintiff in all other
Flint me:rchandis·e· ('Tr. 1198 to 1'200, 16:51, Ex. 53). It
there,after developed that Badger ha~d not 'at all he·en
foreed out of rthe appliance business. .On the contrary,
he and ·Bradley were :doing business 'at the old 'Stand.
He would hav.e. 'left the imp,ression with the jury that
the· only sources of appliances were the four distributor
defendants. It was later made to 'aJp~pe,ar without dispute
fuat there were fifteen 'Oir twenty other ·distrihutors in
S'alt L:ake City who 'sold wide1y advertised and well
re'cognized :electrical ap~pli,ances to retailers (Tr. 1940,
20B2. to 2086).
I

1

At the time of the trial Badger and Brrudley were
conducting an 1ap,pliance 'store in plaintiff's old 'Stand
and were and lrad 'been vigorously and persistently 'advertising their business (Ex. 7 ·to 23). Upon cross e~am
irration of Badger, questions were asked for the purpose
of el~eiting tihe admission that he and Bradley were still
in the ap~plianee ~bu:sines's at 38 M~ain Street. A review
of p1ages 9'2:3. 1and 9:24 of the record will,show how lacking·
in candor and forthrightness was Mr. Biadge·r.
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Upon cross examination B~adger was confronted
''ith numerous newsp,ap·er advertisements p~ublis~hed by
him and Bradley and ·advertising their appliance business at 38 South Main S'treet ~during the ye,ar's 1949
and 1950. It was even 'POinted out to Badger upon cross
examination that he and Bradley were adverti,sing fo:r
sale the very lines ·of merchandise. whi ch he ~claimed
were lost by the withdrawal of lines by the four dis~
tributor defendants. He 'admitted causing su~h 'advertisements to he publi·shed, and was ·asked whether in
fact ·he had in 'stock the merchandise he was ~advertising
for ~sale. Hi'S 'answer to that question was ''Did we have
to ,have it~" (Tr. "827, Ex. 19).
1

The ~answer as above quoted shows a naiv.e: dis:regard
by Mr. ·Badger ror the F'air ~Trade Laws of the ·State of
Utah.
1

'Section 16A-4~8 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1943,
provides: ''It shall ·he unlawful ~fior any p~erson enga.ged
in 'business within the State of Utah to advertise goods,
wares or merichandi:S'e they 'are not p'rep,ared to s.up~p~ly.''
.&s a piart of p~raintiff''s ahnormal 'cutr:ate advert:i:sing, it circulated thouSands 'Of carrds through the
mail addressed to names secured from an extensive
mailing list ~and asked ~ach recipient to S"end in to. the
plaintiff the model and age of ·his w~s'hing machine.·
This was ·requested with the P'romise that the p.el}son
identifying hi's wrushing machine as the oldest washing
m~hine of aN to respond would he given a new Easy
Washer ('Tr. 895, 89 6). It is made to appear hy the
1
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testimony of the P'laintiff tfuat many 'hundreds~ of reSiponses werH teceived. "When suffi~ient time had pa;s,sed
to bring -'this ,~o-cal1ed contest to a close, numerous p-ersons ealled plaintiff',s 'Store to inquire who ha.d won the
was~her. Having re1ceived numerous such calls, and being
unable to rrrune for them the winner ·of the washing
machine, ¥rs. 'Thorpe, ~a lady emp,loyee of the plaintiff
inquired ~of Mr. Bradley, ''are you going to have a p~re
sen·tation of thi'S was·her ~ '' To Which Bradley replied,
'' Aroe. you kidding.'' H·e laughed, an~ she said, ''Have
yoru given it~" And he sai~d, "No, we can't afford it."
('Tr. 1'900, 1901). ·Tirat Bradley made the statement just
quoted stands in the record without dispute. The only
fair inference from this incident is that p~aintiff carried
on a contest with never 'any intention of ke-ep,ing its part
of 'the 'arrangement. Badger, as President of the pl'aintiff, mus:t have known of this shady bit of business.
I

In 1949 Badger filed a sworn s·tatement with 1fu.e
assessor 'Of S'alt !Jake County stating ·the plaintiff's
inventory as of J·anuary 1, 1949, ·at a value of $17,873.9'3
(Ex. 49). That 1sworn st~tement was intended to be
the ibasis for t·ax lirubility of the P'laintiff eorpoTa:tion.
P 1aintiff introduced as evidence in thi'S case an exhibit
p•replared :for ·the pruiipose~ o:f influencing the jury in its
assessment of d'ama,ges. wherein its inventory ~as of
Dec_ember 3.1, 19:48 was $50,422:.06, (Ex. AAA). The jury
1

was justified in Te'j'ectin.g Badger -as -a convinicing witness,
but the court ·ha;s now rule~d that the jury' was bound
to :a.ccep~t his evidence as clear and convincing.
1
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Bradley, like B·adger, went righ-t on with tfhe retail
appliance business. at the pJ,aintiff's old stand, 38 S10u.tih
Main ·Street, with scareely an interru.ption, yet 'he joined
Badger in seeking damages against the defendants in
the ·sum of $600,000.00. Bradley, like Badger, :and in
cooperation with B·adger, pU!blicly advertise~d ~the 'Sale
of merch'andise whi0h they did not have·. Bradley testified tlrat he did not h·ave notice that RCA .p~honograph
records were f~air traded until January 6, 1949 ('Tr.
1160). Plaintiff's own witnes's, Mrs. Thorpe, testified
that formal noti~e. was !brought to Bradley and a.ssoci·ates
on D·ooember 28, 1948. At the time· the, notices were
brought to the s't'()lre Bradley was. '' kiS'sing one of the
girls under the mistletoe'' (Tr. 1'902, 1903. Ex. 3'2:).
Even 'Such an entertaining diversion eould not h·a;ve
blinded him to the fact ~that ·a man came into the store
and left fue notice· on the :eounter within only a few
feet ·of Bradley. Mrs. Thorp~e testified that She knew
of the fair trading of RC..A rooo~ds, ·and if she knew
it certainly the jury was entitled to 'be1lieve under all
the circumstances that Bradley knew it.
1

1

1

For a long ti~me Bradley h·ad been directing the
s:ale of RCA reeoT·ds in violation of the F·air Trade laws,
and had ibee·n doing ·so hy the sale of !coupon hooks.
When Bruce: McKee, ·a reeor·d salesman for Salt Lake
1

I

H·ardware, asked Bradley about the sale of coupon
books, ·Bradley ·de.nied ·that he or his 'aSS'ociates we·re·
se'lling coupon ·book!s ('Tr. 1949'). T'hat statement was
clearly not true.
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Bradley eaused a registered letter to be· sent to
Harold H. Bennett 'On the 6th day of January, 1949· (Tr.
1673, Ex. 54) stating that Briant ·s. Badger h·ad entirely
severed his eonnection with the plaintiff. Shortly thereafter, :and on the ~2:2·nd ·day oif January, 1949, Br'adley
and T·anner 'Called Ulpon Mr. Bennett in an effort to
reestaJhlish dealings ~betwee,n p~aintiff and Z. C. M. I. in
E·asy Washer~s. ('Tr. 1674, 2127 et seq.)'. .O.n that day
B·radley -and ·T'anner knew ~tlrat Badger had not Ieft
p~aintiff, ibut was still its President. 'They thought Bennett might resume ftle. sale of wrushers to ·Bradley if he
thought B~adger was no longer involved. Upon that
assump,tion they induced Mr. Bennett to believ-e that
B~adger had retired from Uptown. They not 'only falsely
and :affirmatiVie:ly represented that B'adger had left the
plaintiff's busine!s s, but conce!aled from B.ennett the
fact that Tlanner had wctually resigned hi'S: office with
p;laintiff and had arr:anged to resume empJo~ent with
Wells., B axte:r and Miller ,('T'r. 167:5).
1

1

Bradley admitted that a major p·ericentage
of busi,
ness d:one hy p~a.intiff wiifu. Flint was in Zenith radios,
and that Flint agreed plaintiff eould 'CJontinue tn 1seTI
Zenith ;at ·all of plaintiff's outlets, and yet B·radley would
have 'hrud the jury ibelieve that Flint ruined p1laintiff
fby refusing to s~ell merchundise to it.
Bradley and McDonough e~neour'a.ge.d Mrs. Thorpe,
manager of their recor1d dep,artme·nt, to seeure empioyment laJS manager of Robert Nevins' record dep,a,rtment.
1
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X eYins is one of t~he defendan~ts, and Bradley an'd
McD·onough urged ~Irs. Tho11p1e to enter ~ evins emp~loy
as · · :Jia.ta. Hari'' and thereafter sp~y on Nevins and turn
over to them confidential information from Nevins'
files. They urged her ''to load Nevins up' with records
and then quit !him" ('Tr. 1140).
Bradley admitted that after counsel ·had been employed to 'bring this action he and counsel had "reconstru~ted the converS'ations" ('Tr. 1188 to 119'2) upon
whi,ch plaintiff relied at the trial for re'covery. McDonough j'Oined with Bradley in an effort to hrrbe Mrs.
Thorpe to get the confidence of Robert Nevins, and
then abuse it by turning 'Over confidential information
to them (Tr. 1139).
'T'he fourth of pilaintiff',s frour officers to testify
was Tanner. He had been trained in the ·high ethics of
his pirofession, 'hut upon the witnes s stand he was indeed
a sorry figure.
1

Tanner was invited into the enterp~rise because· of
his sup~pos·ed 'Skill and 'ability in the p!roper keep~ing of
:financial records. After this suit was file;d 'T,anner he·gan
the

p~rep,aratron

of finanei~al exhlbits to sustain the p~lain

tiff's demands. In order to make the financial records
which he :had made in the

regul~ar

eourse of business

stand Ulp as support for ·the comp,laint he round it ne ces1

sary or conve·nie-nt to make 99 changes in the re~ords
('T·r. 1390). He never kep1t a physical invoentory which
_I
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Is necessary in ·aecO:rdance with the standards. o:f his
p~rofes'Sion if a .correct financial hrs'tory of the enter:prise
is to be maintained.
While on eross. examination Tanner was confronted
with 'a financial statement which he, as p·rin'cipal aecounting officer and treasurer of the p~laintiff, had given to
a credit organization to refleet pl•aintiff's financial condition as of NoiVemher '30, 1'948. He admitted that the .
statement was ·given fio~ the purpose of maintaining
and securing -credit ('Tr. 16;68). He admitted that the
statement railed to di1selose app•roximately $30,708.68 of
a!ccounts. p1ayable (iTr. 1653). When asked if the omi·s,sion
of those accounts p•ayable wa:s in accordance with the
standards and ethi'cs ·of his p·rofes:sion, he stated if he
had certified the statement as a Certified Puhlic Accountant he would have heen iborund to include the a;ecounts
payable, but inasmuch ·as he was not certifying the
statement ·he felt at liberty to omit the accounts payable
('Tr. 169·5). It will he· remembered that the aJccount·s payable wh~ch were· omitted totalled in dollars almost double
the amount of !p[aintiff's entire· capital. The· only permissible inference from T·anner's testimony was that
aecording to his morro standards ·as long as he did not
certify ia statement to 'he true, he was free to he dishonest with his. creditor's and p•rosp~ective creditors.
1

Early in the, year

1

19~49

'T:anner prep,ared a statement

for the ·C,onnty Ass·e'Ssor which was

signe~d

under oath

by Badger, President of plaintiff cor·poration.
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statement ,,. .as prepared and sworn to :Dor the purpose
of giving the County Assessor ·a basis for asses'sing
taxes against the p•laintiff corporation. The statement
so prepared by Tanner (Ex. 49) ·and sworn to by Badger
fi.."'{ed the plaintiff's inventory •as of January 1, 1949,
at $17,873.93. In an ·exhibit {AAA) 1prep~ared for the
trral of this cas.e by Mr. Jeffs from the hooks kep~t by
Tanner, the inventory of p~aintiff as of the same time
was shown at more than $50,000.00. That exhibit was
submitted for the purpose of showing the value of
plaintiff's business on January 1, 19·49, as a hasis for
the measurement of damages hy the jury. This conflict
was s.ubmitted to Tanner shortly lbe~oTe the noon reces·s.
His immediate reaction was reflected by his voluntary
statement that it was "'apparently an error" (Tr.
1622). When foreed to answer whethe!r he thought it
was honest to give one sworn ~statement to the County
Asses'Sor for tax. p~urposes ·and 'another entirely different
sworn statement as to the firm's, financial condition f.O:r
the purpos-e 'Of proving damages, he :fin:ally s-uggested
that it woul·d he all right to leave out the statement
prepared for the trial (Tr.l6·98).
In January ·of 1'949, 'T,anner and Bradley, as officers
of plaintiff, -called upon Harold H. Bennett, rus M·anrager
of Z. ·C. M. I., in the hope of inducing Bennett to resume
business relations with 1pJaintiff. Although 'T anner and
1

Bradley ·did husiness just across the· street from Bennett';s office, they had recently, before ~ailling upon Bennett, sent Bennett ·a registere:d letter (Ex. 54) to the
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effect that B~adger was no, longer in any way conne'cted
wrth Jil:aintiff. When they called upon Mr. Bennett they
knew that the 'le~tter 1fuey had S'ent him wrus not true,
but they intended to leave Bennett with the impression
that Badger was no longer eonnected with plaintiff.
Bennett had neve:r met Badger, and he asked Bradley
and Tanner why they ·had sent him the letter. ·T,anner
replied that they al'l knew that th.eir business difficulties
had resulte:d from Badger's queer ideas of conducting
a busine'sis, and ·they thought that if Bennett believed
that Badger was no longer ·connected with them he would
resume sup,plying merchandise CTr. 2'127 to 2129). And
yet the trial eourt now rules that the jury wa;s comp~elled to believe and he convinJced by 'Tanner and
Bradle·y.
The 'Course 'Of ~de:aling between plaintiff and Glenn
Earl has heretof:ore been summarized. Glenn Earl was .
thrust forwa,r:d ·at the trial by pl'aintiff as its ace witneS's.
It was p~laintiff's hope that through Glenn Earl the
jury could ibe convinced that E:arl and other distriibuto~s
had been induced to ;alte:r their relations with p~laintiff
because of concerted acts of the· dealers. He was upon
the witneS S stand ror the 'better piart of a ·week, and a
review of his testimony in ·detail will demonstrate what
a weak and unreli~alble sup1port he wa:s for p~laintiff's
case. It will he made p~lain that he was the genesis of
p~aintiff's business ·difficulties. He was -caught with a
1

stoc;k of obsolete merc:handise Which he disposed of hy
imposition upon the plaintiff. He sought to and did
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transfer the results of his hnp~rovi·dent purchases up~on
the inexperienced officers of p l'aintiff. He would ha:ve
had the jury believe. that plaintiff's business difficulties
arose from pressure exerted by retailerts in Salt Lake
City. On cross examination he admitted that as a distributor he \Va;s free to sell to retai'l outlets exclusively
aceording to his O\Vll judgment and decision. He admitte·d
that he was rat li!herty to appoint retail outlets and to
cancell retail outlets. a:s his busines·s judgme·nt dictated.
1

1

Among those ·authorized to sell his p~roducts at retail were the plaintiff, Frank Warren 'and ·the 'Summerhays :Jiusic C·omp,any. ·On dirieet e·xamination he testified that he had eancelied the licenses of plaintiff, Frank
Warren and Summerhays Musrc C·ompany. He volunteered the stateme·nt upon the witness stand that he cancelled those licen·se·s to demonstrate ''that he. -could not
be pushe·d around.'' He· testified in effect that he ran
his own business and wanted to make it clear that he
would not b·e the vietim of dealer pressure ( Tr. 1333).
:Subsequently he testified that he had ~ancelled the
licenses of plaintiff, Frank Warren and Summerhays
because of dealer p·ressure. Thus, his suhsequen t testimony was in direct conflict with his earlier testimony
upon the s-ame sU!hject. His 'testimony on the two different occasions was. in f·a;ct irreconcilable. He was
pressed upon eross examination to reconcile the conflict.
Hi s answer was that 'he had changed his statement after
counsel had cal'led that testimony to his attention ('Tr.
13'32, 13'33) .
I

1
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Earl made· much upon direct e~amination of what he
ch.'~racterized ..as thre.ats upon the p 1art of E. ~- Royle

Company -and :The Paris ·Comp,any to advertise RCA
products Rt ·a discount as. long as. P'laintiff wa:s p~ermitted
to· do ;so~ H·e testified that it· was: his volicy ·as a dis.tributor, ·and the· p,o!Jicy ·of- Radio Corporation of America
to fioribid 'advertising o.f RJCA p~roducts at a di'scount. It
.

I

wa~ the~ pointed out

to -~irn upon cross examiri~t~ion that

· plaintiff had heen broadcasting over the facilities of a
local hroa:dcasting 'compHny that any listener who could
guess.' the name of a well known tune could buy an RCA
radio at a heavy discount. It was also point~d out to him
thltt

p~aintiff

had heen ·resorting to various and devious

me~ans

.of 'bringing knowledge to the public that RCA

r~adio1s

could be

pur~chaJsed

at

p~aintiff's

store :at a di·s-

count. He even admitted that he had been piarticiprating
in the exp·ense of plaintiff's p·romotion, an.d that the cO'st
of the P'articiJp1ation was charged upon his hooks !3JS. ·~ad-·
verti'Sing. When. probed as, to why, in view of his annoilllced policy forbidding advertising R,CA products
·at 'a 'dis-count, he wolild permit p·laintiff to indulge in the
p.romotions 'We have· des'crihed and at the same· time forIbid Royle and others from meeting the comp,etition of
P'laintiff ·by :advertising RC:A in!struments 'and records
at a

dis~orunt,

his

'an'SW~:r wa~

that the sales

p~romotions

conducte-d by p~airttiff were not advertising, but were
''games of skill'' :( Tr. 1'302:).
1
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Such hedging ·and weasling by the witness could he
ca1eulated only to discredit him before the jury, an.d yet
the trial court has ruled t'hat the jury was boun·d to accept
hin1 as a clear and convincing witness.
,,. .e invite the court's attention to the ca·se of Jackman v. Lawrence Drilling Co., 187 P. 258, wherein the ·Snf!Jreme Court of Kansas stated that the requirement that
proof be clear and· convincing means, '' 'Th·a.t the· evidence
should ibe clear, that it is not ·ambiguous, doubtful, equivocal or contradictory, and should be persp~icuoU:s and
pointed to the issue under investigation; and. satisf·actory in the 'Sense that the source from wh~ch it comes
is of such a creditruh1e- nature that the court and jury as
men of ordinary intelligence, discretion ·and eaution m~a.y
repose eonfidence in it. Ahsolut~ certainty is, o:f course,
not required.'' The testimony of B:adger, Bradley, McDonough, Tanner and Earl failed to square with any of
the standards set forth by the ·Sup.reme Court of Ka.nsa:s.
And yet, the trial court ha;s ruled that the jury wa.s
bound to 1be clearly ~convinced by the testimony oif ~all of
those witnesses, .and that unti·l p~laintiff',s demands for
damages in the sum of $600,000.00 is satisfied justice
will have mi·s'earried.
More needs to be said of the witness Mrs. Arva
Thorp~e,

also ealled Toni Thorpe. She was the manager

of plaintiff's phonograph record

dep~artment

from Aug-

ust, 1948, until January ·22, 19·49· ('T·r. 1088). As such she
was at the

M~ain

·Street store ·during all business hours,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

58

and in frequent -contact each ·day with Badger, Bradley,
McDonough and :T:anner. Ap~parently she had made some
contact with defendant Nevins ('Tr. 1096) and with the
defendant Bigelow ('Tr. 1089 to 1091) while still em- .
p~loyed hy the !plaintiff. 'The su!bject of empJoyment w·as
discussed between her and Nevins and with Bigelow. Ap-p~arently P'laintiff construed those contacts as evidence
that Nevins and Bigelow were trying to impair plaintiff's business hy offering employment to Mrs. Thorp·e.
At 'any rate, that seems to he the purpose £or which she
was sworn and vouched for lb~ P'laintiff.
But upon ·cross examination Mrs. Thorp-e gave evidence which ·characterize,d P'laintiff's entire ·ease i-p. general, and P'lainti'ff's witnesses Bradley ·and McDonough
in p:artiicular, as heing entirely unrelia:hle and unconvin~
ing. She te'Stified that in the early part of J·anuary, while
she was still an emp,loyee of p~laintiff, Bradley and ~{}.
D~onough engaged her in conViersation during which they
informed he:r that they were contemplating a suit against
Robert Nevins ·and others. They encouraged he·r to iseek
and aceept employment with Mr. Nevins, and in thi S
conneet~on told her that if she would gain the eonfidence
of 1\!r. Nevins ~and produce: evidence to support their laMTsuit it would he worth $1,000.00 to her (Tr. 113:9'). :She
was urged to 'gain N e'Vins' confidence ~and then ·'bring
!back 'confi~dential information to the· pJaintiff. .&s she put
it, fue,y ·sugge,sted that she- o~pe·rate as a "M·ata Hari"
('Tr. 1140). :Sher did ·aJ,ecep:t emp,loyment with Mr. Ne-vins,
but her conseience prevented her from op~eratin.g as
'' Mata. H~ari. ''
1

J
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·She "~as a'bout to relate an exp,erience with Warwick
C. Lamoreaux one of plaintiff's :counsel. 'The trial Judge
refused to let the jury hear her testimony in that connection, but in the absence ·of the jury she testified that
after she had been in Nevins' empJoy for ·some weeks
she received a telephone call from Mr. Lamore·aux inviting her to lunch. She \vas frightened about the matter,
hut with 'Some misgivings, ·she a;ccepte·d the invi·tation and
took lunch with Mr. Lamoreaux at a down town ~afe.
I
l\fr. Lamoreaux asked her if Mr. Nevins was ·a p1arty to
any conspiracy and she stated, '''To the hest of my knowledge he was not.'' ( Tr. 1100). He urgHd her to gain additional information from Nevins and she rep,lied thlllt she
was frightened and wasn't interested in getting additional information. She did, h!orwev.er, p·romise that she
wouJ.d see him again.
While they were together she mis'Sed one of her gloves.
While looking £or it she ohs·erved that L:amoreaux held
it in his h·and. He tos1s ed it hack on the t~bJe. When she
endeaV<ored to p~lace it upon her hand she discovered a
ten-dollar hill folded within it. When Lamoreaux returned the glove he stated, ''There wiH be more of this,
and we will take care of you, hut we can't meet in pillb~ic
from now on." {Tr. 1101).
Ther·e is real flavor to that episode. While the jury
wa'S not perrn.itted to hear it, the jury di·d hear enough
from the lips of Mrs. Thorpe to clearly indicate the la~ck
of good faith in plaintiff's entire case. The trial Judge
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tiff's case· was hound to he alqcep~ted by the jury as clear
and -convincing, and that until praintiff p~revails there will
be a nrisearriage of justice.
Plaintiff 'offered other witnesses whos~e testimony
related to iS'olated incidents and is of little or no significance, ·exeept for the testimony of Rulon Jeffs, an accountant who was employed by plaintiff to audit its
books. He came up with some interesting sidelights.
First, he had to reeonstru·ct the· adcounting whi~h- had
heen·kep~t by Mr. Tanner and reach his conclusions by reference to work sheets rwhich Tanner had ·made from the
ibooks. One small incident revealed by ·T!anner would he
really humorous if it ·did not diselose such a complete lack
of good faith un the p~art of plaintiff. Plaintiff detailed
upon exhibits the items of loss which· it alleged it had
sustained 1hy the unlawful conduct of defendants. .Among
the items going to make up the $'200,000.00 damage was
one for $10.00 p~aid for the. rental up~on a casket. After
this suit had 'been brought plaintiff S'ought to inflame
the· ·public again:st the defendants by garish and dramatic display in its show windows. It posted parts of its
complaint in the show windows, and exhibited a casket
with dry skull ·an·d magpie ~rus sUlp1porting seenery. This
was accomp,anied hy funeral music played over the~ir
loud 'Speake·r, an·d hy remarks made for the purpose of
gaining symp,athy for themselves and hostility for the
defendants. For the use of that casket as ~a show window
exhj!bit p~laintiff p·aid a rental of $10.00. It sought in this
J

lawsuit to recover from the defe·ndants the cost of that
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1

morbid exhibit. Any $10.00 item as such would he of
small cons·equence, but tl1is $10.00 item was a tip off to
the shady chal'lacter of plaintiff's entire laws-uit ('Tr.
1511, 1512).
The fabric of plaintiff's elaim of conspiracy was
woven around certain conversations alleged to have taken
plae:e with and concerning plaintiff and its officers. Chi·ef
reliance ".,.a:s rested upon two conversations between
Leland B. F·Iint, of Flint Distributing Comp~any, and
Harold H. Bennett, M·anager of Z. C. M. I. It was claime'd
that. Flint, having withdrawn certain merchandi·s·e from
plaintiff called uJpon Bennett and that Z. C. M. I. shortly
thereafter withdrew Easy Washers from resale. by the
plaintiff. Plaintiff was then p·ermitted to offer evidence
of numerous conversations alleged to have heen had at
various times and places with salesmen of Z. C. M. I.
All such -conversations were offered and re~eive·d to
support the charge of :conspirooy between Flint and Z.
C. M. I. to rwhich it was alleged other defendants had attached themselves.
The jury found ther:e was no conspiracy. The court,
hy its order, ·acquiesced in the jury's finding that
Z. C. M. I. was no piart of any consp~iracy. It rrow having
been adjudicated that Z. ·C.. M. I. was no p1art of any
conspiracy, all hears•ay receive·d in evidence to conne•ct
Z. ·C. M. I. with th·e alleged conspiracy would, upon another trial, he incompetent and inadmissible against any
of the remaining defendants. It i's :tnost earnestly sub. .
mitted that a revie·w of the entire record will show that
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if Z. ·C. M. I. was not ·a eonsp·irator, then Flint was not
a conspirator. And if Flint was not a eonspirator there
was no eonslpU.racy among any distributors because it is
now finally adjudicated by order of the ·court that Graybar Electric and S·alt Lake Hardware, like Z. C. M. I. are
not consp·irators.

Reams of hearsay testimony relating to ~statements
made iby S'alesmen and re~presentatives of Gray'har Electri'C c:omp,any and 'Salt Lake Hardware Comp·any were
received in evidence· in sup~port of p·lain tiff's theory that
the three -companies just mentioned were engaged in a
conspiracy. It having heen judicially settled that they
were not so engaged, most of that testimony would he
entirely incompetent upon another trial.
Pl·aintiff's ·claim for damages is brused upon the
theory that its business was ruin·ed because merchandise
distributed fby Graybar Electric, Z. C. M. I., Salt Lake
Hardware, and Flint was withdrawn. It is now determined that Graybar, Z. C. M.. I., ~and Salt L:ake Hardware
1

lawfully withdrew their merchandise, and in all the vast
record made helow there is nothing to indicate that any
withdrawal of merchandise (by Flint ruine·d, or could have
ruined, P'l•aintiff's. bU!siness. :The reeord shows quite the
contrary.
After Flint and the p·laintiff ceased to do business
with each other, plaintiff informed Harold H. Bennett
that if p•laintiff got the E·a:sy Washers hack it could make
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a suooess of its business ( Tr. 1166). The record also
sho\\~s that Flint did not 'vithd:vaw his merchandise from
plaintiff tT·r. 19!68, 770).
Flint refused to 1p1ermit the sale of certain of his
lines through the Pierpont warehouse, but he agreed to
the continued sale of Zenith radios at all of p~laintiff's
outlets, and agreed to the continued sale of Bendix and
Kelvinator products at the Main Street and State Street
stores of plaintiff, respectively. Plaintiff rejected all of
the Flint lines .upon the ground that they no longer
trusted Flint. Zenith radios were the dominating Flint
merchandise in plaintiff's orperation, and Flint urged
plaintiff to keep them and to continue to sell them ('Tr.
768, 1020, 1154). It is now adjudicated that whatever Wlts
done iby Graybar Electric, Z. ·C. M. I. and Salt L:ake
Hardware was ·done for lawful reasons of their own,
and was not done in furtherance of any conspiracy
among themselves, or with Flint, or with .anyone else.
Note certain o.f the court's instructions on this aspe ct
of the case:
1

I nstructiorn No. 8.

A. Plaintiff did not have· the right to re·quire the defendants, or any of them, to sell to it
mer.ehandise for re·Hale at the Pierpont Street
warehouse, or at any trade area not of the choosing of such defendant or in a location not p·ro:vided
for 'by agreement.
B. You are also instructed that a person or
eorp·ora.tion in private enterp~rise has no right to
refuse to ~sell to ~another p1erson if such refusal
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is made- for the purpose of furthering a conspiracy
or combination to fix or maintain P'rices or a con'spir:~cy t101 cut off a person's supp·lies for the purpose of lessening competition.

'C. !The defendant distributors were at liberty (if they .were not intending to aid in a combination in restraint of trade), to cancel any s·ales
agreement and stop· 'selling any merchandise to
plaintiff whenever the- sales p·ractice·s of plaintiff
· became embarrassing to them in the ·o~perationand
-conduct of their respective businesses, or for any
other re~son p•e-rso~al to the defendants acting individually. !Such defendant distributors had the
right to determine for themselves whether further
sale's of merchandise of any kind to !plaintiff
woruld he- to their best interests. Such a decision
to stop· selling to the plaintiff.hy such ·defendants,
if ructing independently .therein, would he lawfUl.
D. If any defendant ·distributor felt that the
trade P'ractices of the· pJaintiff were injurious to
the business of the said ·defendant or for any
reason or for no reason at all, acting :solely iby
itself and upon its own initiative, the said 'distributor could refuse to sell to the· p~ainti'ff, that is,
~as long as itg re·fusal. was not a part of a comJhination with others to act together in restraint of
trade.
In his ruling upon P'laintiff',s motion for a new trial
the court found no fault with the aho¥e instructi:on. When
Flint authorized the sale by plaintiff of his merchandise
plaintiff had no o~eration on Pierpont ~Street. When
Flint discovered that his merelrandise was being sold
through the warehouse on Pierpont he h·ad the right to
·determine for himself whether he would permit the sale
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of all or any of his lines through that outlet. He determined that he could not permit his Bendix and Kelvinator
lines to ·be so sold. At the same time he concluded that
he would pern1it the sale of Zenith radios at the warehouse. The record is clear beyond any substantial dispillte that Flint's de·cision in th·at ·particular did not and
could not unlawfully affect plaintiff's business. It is
equally clear that Flint's ~decision was not hased upon
anything done or ·omitted by any 'dealer.

An effort was made by plaintiff to prove that Flint's
decision with respect to plaintiff was foreed by The Paris
·Company which sold Flint's Kelvinator and Zenith
products at retail. What occurred between Flint and
.The P;aris C·omp~any is wholly without dispute in the
record. It was the testimony of the Vice President of
The Paris C·ompany that it was the historical poliey of
his store to find ·out at all times what his competition
was, and then to meet it. He was told that p~laintiff wa:s
selling Zenith radios at a discount. To !confirm that. information he caused one ~of his employees to ''shop''
plaintiff in aecordance with the estahlishe·d p~ractice of
retail merchants. As a result a Zenith :r adio was !prurchas·ed from the p;laintiff hy 'The Paris Company at a
sll!bstantial discount. The Paris Company did not then
comp·lain either to Flint or to the p·laintiff. On the contrary, and in ·accordance with its usual custom, The p:aris
1

Company published an advertisement in a Salt L:ake
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ment app·eared Flint called upon The Paris Company
and stated that the p~laintiff did not like 'The Paris ·Comp,any's p~rice cutting on Zenith. The r~ply was that 'The
Paris 'Company was simply meeting plaintiff's competition, and Flint was handed the s~ale'S ti~ket eovering the
purchase 'oif the radio from the plaintiff. That is all there
was to that -conversation between Flint and 'The Paris
Company respecting the pJairrtiff (Tr. 1070 to 1075).
On another occasion Mr. Dreyfous of 'The Paris
·Comp~any, inquired of Flint whether Kelvinator products were· being sold by the plaintiff through the Pierpont
warehouse. Flint's reply was "No," and that wrus the
extent of that conversation ('Tr. 1068, 1069). Wh·en asked
why he inquired of Flint whether Kelvinator was being
sold through plaintiff's warHhouse, Dreyrorus r•eplied,

''I wanted to know where our com·petition wa;s.'' (Tr.
1069).
;The foregoing reflects all the record with respect
to any !contacts between Flint 'and Th.e Piaris

Comp~any,

relating to the pJaintiff, an·d yet the trial corurt has ruled
that the· jury was bound to he clearly convinced that a
conspiracy existed between Flint and ·The Pari'S C'omp:any. There never w1as ani!J clear amd convincing evidence
of the existence

of

'01YIIY co1Vsvpiracy. With three of the

four distr:i!butors definitely and permanently out of the
case, all hearsay testimony tending to tie those distributo·rs to any -conspiracy would he

ineomp~etent

upon an-
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other trial. It would indeed be ;a mis:earriage of j·ustie:e
to subject these a.ppell~ants to the expense of another
trial.

III.
(a) The record of the trial below will show that the
granting of a new trial as to these appellants and each
of them, was arbitrary, capricious and ,an abuse of discretion.
(ib} The record will show that the granting of a
new trial ·did not result from the e~ercise of sound judicial discretion, but rather from prejudiee and bias in
favor of plaintiff, or ;p,laintiff's counsel, or against defendants, or their counsel, which p~rejudice ·and bias was
shown p~rior to and during the trial of the case.

All of counsel for all of the :defendants were 'Oif the
opinion that J·udge Jeppson was so far hiase·d as to
justify an appli;cation for his disqua.lifieation ·as trial
Judge.
January 3, 19150, the ·day upon which the trial began,
was the first day upon rwhich rule ·63 ('h) of the Utah Rules
of Civil P'rocedure became applicable·, and upon that day
all attorneys for all defendants joined in an Affidavit
of Bias, 'Certificate of Cnunsel, and App,lication for Disqualifieation of Judge ('Sup,ra. Page./.~_, Tr. 101-104).
1

The bias o:f the trial Judge up to and including the
trial was over:come by the verdict of the jury in favor
of all of these aplpellants, hut we urge that bias persisted
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after the trial and that ib~as rather than sound judicial
'
discr:etion resulted
in the granting of a new trial as to
these appellants.
Because we take this position we feel hound to assume the unp,leasant duty of pointing out wherein the
record supports the charge of bias upon the p~art of the
trial Judge.
It will be remembered that plaintiff filed its comp,laint in F'ebruary, 1949. The parties were fin~lly at
issue upon p~laintiff':s third amended :complaint, and counsel wer·e noticed to appear before Judge Jelp~pson on
November ·9, 1949·, fo·r a ·setting of the case for trial. On
that day Judge Jeppson had the case 'before him and
announced to eoung.el that he would have to dispose of
the ease promp,tly 'beeause he would not he trying contested eases after January 1, 19·50 CTr. 267). There was
no ap~parent reason why he should have felt under any
special duty to try this particular case. · His determination to hold onto the ease and try it without regard to the
convenience of the parties 'became clearer from day to
day as he had !COunsel 'before him upon p~re-trial matters.
Having· announced on November 9, 1949, that he
would not he trying contested cases after January 1,
1950, he set the -case ror trial on December 1'2, 1949, and
called a p·re-trial for November 28th CTr. 306, 307).
1

O·n N o:v;embe·r 28th, counsel for defendants moved
for postponement of the trial until afte·r January 1,
19'50, and urged that Decemlher was the busiest month of
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the year for merchants, and that a trial in December
would impose a heavy hardsh]p, upon defendants. At that
point Judge J·eppison again called attention to the change
in trial judge personnel which would 'be'come effective
after January 1, 19'50 ('Tr. 309·) and indieated his determination to hold onto the case and try it ' before rotation
in judicial p·ersonnel took him away from the trial of
contested matters.
On November 28, 19~9, plaintiff was permitted to
make certain formal amendments to its third amended
complaint and suggested its intention to make further
substantial amendments. D·efendants ohj·ected to the
allowance of any further ·amendments. At that point defendant!s renewe·d their request for a continuance until
after January 1st. ~Such r~equest was again urverruled
(Tr. 308 to 330). A further pre-trial hearing was called
before Judge Jepps·on for Decemlber 5, 19'49. ·On that day
plaintiff p·ro1p10sed substantial amendments to its third
amended comp~laint as ·amended. Defen·dants ohjeeted to
the allowance of such amendments. 'The Judge then
orde'red p·laintiff to serve its prop·osed amendments upon
defendants and shortened the time to ohject to the amendments to three days. At that time the Judge moved the
trial date from De[cemher 1'2', up, to December 27 ('Tr. 9·4).
Again defendants urged ·a postponement of the case until
after the first of the year, and again the motion was
denied.
On December 9, 1949, Judge Jep·pson, orver the ohje:ction of the :defendants, allowed further and substanSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tial amendments to p~laintiff's third amended complaint
as amended. At the same time he denied the motron of
Graybar Electric Company and Z. C. M. I. to be allorwed
to counterclaim against the plaintiff ('Tr. 97). Having, on
December 9th, allowed substantial amendments to plaintiff's third amended comlp1aint, as amended, Judge Jepp·son, upon his own motion, and without any showing
whatsoever, made his order requiring all defendants to
p1lead to plaintiff's third amended complaint, as amended,
before D·ececmJher 16th, 19·49 ('T'r. 893). !This was a shortening of the time allowed by law without any showing
whatever of any urgency, except the Judge's determination to try the case.
On the afte-rnoon of the last day of the shortened
time, Z. C. M. I., ·The Paris Company and R,eed Bigelow
filed their several demurrers to plaintiff's third
amended comp~laint as ~amended. After the ~ourt had
permitted the pJaintiff to make the amendments to its
third amended eomp·laint at the p·re-trial hearing on D·ecember 1'6·, 19·49, Harold R. Boyer, counsel for Leland B.
Flint and Flint Distributing Comp~any, two of the defendants in the ease, made a motion that the case he
strick!en from the trial calendar upon the ground that the
same was not then at issue. This motion was joined in by
the other def~ndants .and was summarily ·denied by the
Court (Tr. 404, 405). Paul H. Ray, one o:f counsel for
1

defendants, was engaged befor.e a state commission on
the day those demurrers were filed. He ap~p·eared in
Judge Je1p~pson 's court just before 5:00 o 'elock P.M., the
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usual ti1ne for evening recess. Court \vas then in session.
At twenty nunutes to six Judge J ep;pson called up for
argument the demurrers which had just that a.fternoon
been filed. Ray stated to the court that he was entitled
to the statutory notice c:alling up, matters for argument.
The court then announced that the demurrers would he
argued then and there or vvould be forthwith overrule,d
without argument. The following excerp~t from the record illustrates the bias of the court:
'' ThlR. PAUL RAY: I was not able to get
here until late. I was at a hearing at the Cap~itol
till four o'clock. I did not hear the order your
Honor made which brings these demurrers on for
hearing at this time, without notice.
"·THE C:O,URT: I entered .an order that
they he heard at this time, he-cause the time before
the trial is so short it would almost ne:eessitate a
continuance of the -case to get them heard.
1

":The only ohj.ection I have heard is that
counsel has not had time to p~re:pare the argu..
ment.s.
"MR. PAUL RAY: Well, I want to make
the record as ~clear as I ean. I don't think that
counsel has to give any reasons why he is entitled
to stand upon his statutory rights; and before we
make any p~resentation of this demurrer I want to
be unde,rstood that it is ·done upon the order of the
court; that if it is not done now, there would he
no other time to do it.

1

''THE 'COURT: !The order of the court is
that the, demurrer he argued at this time, and the
court will be p~rep~ared to rule on it when you complete your argument.
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'.'MR. P'AUL RAY:. The defendants,.P.aris
Company, Z. C. M. I. and.Bigelow take exception
to the order of the court.

_

''So· that my record may be quite compJete, I
call your Honor's attention to the fact that the
statutory time has not heen given us to p~lead, and
there ·is no, evidence or no 'Showing of any notice
from ~pJaintiff's ·-counsel.
''The· ·statute gives. us ten days to plead. Y.our
Honor shortened that, over our objection. It is
now twenty minutes to six in the afternoon, which
is forty· minutes beyond the ~ustomary time to
hold ·court.
' ' No showing has been made that tltere is any
emergency in this case; no showing made in thi·s
cas.e that anylbody will suffer if the case is not
tried on the 27th of D·ecemher. ·There is nothing in
this reeord which indicates that the defendants'
rights should be sacrificed :for the convenience of
plaintiffs.

''I will p~resent what we have to say, in conne'Ction with this demurrer, under duress of the
·court''S order which depirives me of my time to
p~lead, or the statutory not~!ce to which I am entitled.
'''T·HE C·O·URT':
that is clear.

You may p·roceed. I think

''MR. PAUL: RAY: I did not he·ar what
your Honor said.
"!T,HE CO·URT':
that is -clear.

You may

p~roceed.

I think

·''MR. PAUL RAY: I am p~articularly interested, if the court P'lease, in .their allegations that
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except for a conspiracy, this firm would have done
a volume of business, four years from now(Argument on demurrer.)

'''THE C·OURT: ·The demurrers are overruled. ' ' ( Tr. 434, 435) .

All pending motions ·were on that day overruled and
denied, and all defendants again joined in a motion for
continuance upon the ground that the case was not then
at issue. :nfotion for continuance was denied, and again
Judge Jeppson, upon his own motion, shortened the time
within which ·defendants might answer plaintiff's third
am~nded complaint, .as amended. Instead of allowing the
statutory ten-day period, he re·duced the time to answer
to three days and in some :caHes four days from the time
the plaintiff's amendments were filed ('Tr. 9'9).
Thereafter counsel for plaintiff and defendants
stipulated for a postponement of the trial from December
27, 19·49, to January 3, 1950 (:Tr. 448).
When court OJ)ened on January 3, 1950, all of counsel
for defendants p·resented their affi,davit for disqualification in accordance with Rule ·63(ib) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. The court criti:cized CTr. 456·) counsel
for not filing the affidavit earlier, although he well knew
that that was the first day upon which Rule ·63{b) was
available and applicabJe.
'The court then referred to that portion 'Of the affidavit in which it is stated that "normally, by reason of
the rules and

p~r~ctices

of the Judges of the Third Judi-

1
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cial District Court in and ~or Salt Lake County, ·State of
Utah, certain cases would, as of this date, he assigned
before an entirely different Judge, and that as of this
date the said Honorable J osepih G. J epps'On would not
have assigned to him in regular course the trial of controverted matters,'' and having refe·rred to such statement the Judge characterized it as not true (Tr. 4!50).
He made that eharge of falsehood against all the defendants' counsel, notwithstanding he had stated from the
ibench on N ovemlber 9th, and again on November ·28th,
that after J.anuary 1st he would not he available for the
trial of contested matters ('Tr. 2:67, 309). Judge J e'PP'SOn
then ignored the p~rorvisions o£ Rule 63:(1b), and instead
of certifying a corpy o.f the affidavit to another judge
to ~determine its legal sufficiency, as. required by the ru1e,
he reviewed the affidavit himself ·and lteld it insufficient
i
because (1) it did not show the 'availability of anorther
judge to handle, the matter ('2) because of exp.ense to the
~County (3) and beeause nothing app·eared in the affi·davit which eoruld not have p1reviously been called to the
Court's attention, and (4): heeause the ap~plication of Rule
·6·3-(ih) would not ibe feas:Lhle and would work injustices
under Ruie: t(h). Whereupon the motion for disqualification of judge· was denie·d (Tr. 460). 'The right to disqualify the judge is not subject ·to any su:ch limitations as
those rup~plied hy Judge Jep~pson.
'The p~rejudice of the court ap~p~eared again from time
to time during the trial. During the op~ening statements
of counsel for defendants, counsel was summarizing what
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the evidenee would show and was a:bout to mention the
amount of plaintiff's prayer for damages when the ~ourt
not only stopped counsel and refused to permit him to
mention the amount of plaintiff's prayer, but criticized
counsel in the p:resence of the jury for attemp~ting to
mention the amount prayed for ('Tr. 530).
I

Further incidents during the trial indicated the p~rej
udice of the -court. Mr. Flint had been testifying to
various conversations, to which no objection had been
made. At a point in his testimony Mr. Rofberts made an
objection and the court made the following comment:
''The motion is granted. As given, his testimony in most cases has not heen in the line of conversation. It has been mostly in the way of conclusions. There has not heen objerction heretofore,
but now that objections have starte·d you better
caution the witness to fbe sure his testimony is
different to iwhat it has 'been."
Mr. Gustin who was examinin·g the witness rep1ied:
"I ap~pre'ciate your Honor''s suggestion and
your Honor's assistance.'' (T'r. 1852, 1853).
At another place in Mr. Flint's testimony, upon dhjection of Plaintiff's ~ounsel the court said:
I

"The motion is granted. Mr. Flint, the court
does not want to caution you again to confine that
to conversation.'' (Tr. 1855).
During the trial of the case it develop~ed that one of
the jurors was not ~a qualified juror. Following that 'discovery the defendants moved th·e court for an order of
mistrial. While the Judge wa;s [considering his ruling
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upon that motion he asked counsel for defendants if
they would renew their motion to disqualify him if a mistrial were grante·d and a new trial ordered. Counsel for
defendants inro:vmed the Judge that such motion would
he renewed in the event of a new trial. Judge Jeppson
then denied the motion for mistrial ('Tr. 1248, .1t249,
1257).

Plaintiff's case was without me-rit. It was not estaJhlished by clear and convincing evidence and the order
setting aside the verdict as to these app1ellants was an
abuse of dis'cretion and heyond the power of the trial
court.
WHEREF:O.RE, it is respectfully submitted that
the order complained of he reversed, and the· verdict of
the jury be reinstated.
H.ARL:EY W. GUS!TIN
HAROLD R. BOYER
Atto.rneys for Flint Distributing Compam.y a'11)d LeloJn.d B.
Fliwt
DELBERT M. DRAPER
Attorney for E. M. Boyle
c~ompany,
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